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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Repairable Systems and Maintenance 
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A repairable system is one that can be repaired so that it can perform all of its 
required functions after it has failed. A repair is a corrective maintenance action performed 
on the system. Maintenance can be classified as either preventive ( scheduled) or corrective 
[1]. Corrective maintenance occurs when the system fails and must be repaired. Preventive 
maintenance is scheduled and performed with a deteriorating system where the cost of a 
field failure is much greater than the cost of the scheduled preventive maintenance. 
Preventive maintenance should have the effect of reducing the system's rate of change of 
failures. If preventive maintenance is done incorrectly, the rate of change of failures may 
increase after the maintenance is performed. The cost-to-benefit ratio must be clearly 
understood before preventive maintenance is undertaken. 
In this Thesis, the system under study is an aircraft integrated drive generator 
(IDG). The IDG provides primary electrical power to the aircraft. Two types of time ( or 
age) based replacement preventive maintenance policies are investigated. The first policy 
is a Type II; here, the IDG is overhauled when it has reached a prespecified number of 
operational hours. The second policy is a Type II'; here, the IDG is overhauled at the first 
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failure, provided that it has reached a prespecified number of operational hours. There is a 
distinct difference between an overhaul and a repair. A repair has no significant effect on 
the rate of change of failures for the IDG. An overhaul which requires the unit to be 
completely disassembled, inspected, repaired, and reassembled, has a significant effect on 
the rate of change of failures for the IDG. In both the Type II and 11' maintenance policies, 
the IDG is repaired, not overhauled, if it fails before the prespecified number of flight 
hours have been reached. The principal difference between the Type II and Type II' 
policies is that, the Type II policy requires an operational IDG be removed from service 
for an overhaul at a prespecified number of flight hours, whereas, the Type II' policy 
requires the IDG to have failed and reached a prespecified number of flight hours before it 
is overhauled. This Thesis investigates the dominant IDG failure modes, and using the 
failure data, determines the optimal replacement intervals for the Type IT and II' 
maintenance policies. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This thesis addresses the problem of determining the optimal overhaul interval for 
the Type II and Type 11' maintenance policies and determines the effects of the current 
maintenance policy on the integrated drive generator. To optimize each maintenance 
policy, the following issues are investigated: 
1. Identification of the dominant failure modes of the IDG. 
2. The effect the current maintenance program has on the long-term reliability of the IDG. 
3. The optimal mandatory overhaul interval for a Type II' maintenance policy. 
4. The optimal overhaul interval for a Type II maintenance policy. 
The results will identify and quantify the effects of the current and an optimal IDG 
maintenance policy. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
To parameterize the IDG failure data, the nonhomogeneous Poisson process with 
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a power law intensity function is used. The NHPP approach is commonly used when 
dealing with repairable systems. The failure data are left-truncated to remove the effects of 
infant mortality after an overhaul. The resulting parameters that quantify the peril rate for 
the IDG can be used to evaluate the current maintenance program and to optimize the 
Type II policy. This approach could not be used to optimize the Type II' maintenance 
policy since the theory for the Type II' policy has not been fully developed in the case of 
the NHPP with a power law intensity function. For this reason, a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach is used. The simulation does allow for more information, e.g., state holding 
times and engine changes, to be used in the development of the maintenance model. This 
has a direct effect on the operational and maintenance costs that accompany adoption of a 
new maintenance policy for the actual IDG population. 
1. 4 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter II is a literature review of repairable systems and the applicable preventive 
maintenance policies. Statistical methods, Monte Carlo simulation, and the definitions of 
availability are also covered in this chapter. 
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Chapter III presents the dominant failure modes of the IDG and quantifies the peril 
rate using the natural and nonhomogeneous Poisson process with power law intensity 
function estimates. 
Chapter IV illustrates the use of a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the 
optimal overhaul interval for a Type II' maintenance policy. 
Chapter V demonstrates an analytical approach to determine the optimal overhaul 
interval for a Type II maintenance policy. 
Chapter VI contains concluding remarks, summary, and areas for further work. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Repairable Systems 
2.1.1 Definitions 
The following definitions are necessary to understand repairable systems and the 
difference between a repairable system and a non-repairable part [2]. 
1. Part. An item which is not subject to disassembly and, hence, is discarded the first time 
it fails. 
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2. Socket. A circuit or equipment position which, at any given time, holds a part of a given 
type. 
3. System. A collection of two or more sockets and their associated parts, interconnected 
to perform one or more functions. 
4. Non-repairable System. A system that is discarded the first time that it ceases to 
perform satisfactorily. 
5. Repairable System. A system which, after failing to perform at least one of its required 
functions, can be restored to perform all of its required functions by any method, other 
than replacement of the entire system. 
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The definition of a repairable system is worded to include the possibility that no 
parts are replaced after a failure. For example, the system might be repaired by making 
necessary adjustments. The aircraft IDG is an example of a repairable system. The "parts" 
that make up the IDG would be, for example, gears, housing, pumps, stator, etc. 
2.1.2 Models for Parts 
To better understand a repairable system, the terminology and relationships for a 
part must be discussed [2,3]. Let X be defined as a random variable that is the time to 
failure for the part. The failure distribution function for X is defined as 
Fx(x) = Pr{X s x} assuming Fx to be absolutely continuous, then the hazard rate or force 
of mortality (FOM) is defined as 
2.1.2.1 
where, 
2.1.2.2 
1-Fx(x) = Rx(x) = Pr {X>x}. 2.1.2.3 
The reliability or survivor function, Rx(x), is given by the relationship 
2.1.2.4 
The mean time to failure (MTTF) of a population of parts with failure distribution function 
Fx and PDF fx is 
2.1.2.5 
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The mean residual life function of a part, rx(x) or m.r.l.f., is the expected additional time to 
failure given survival to x. The mean residual life function [ 4,5] is given by the relationship 
2.1.2.6 
2.1.3 Models for Repairable Systems 
Compared with the large amount ofliterature on the subject of units, i.e., parts, 
that fail only once and are discarded ( catastrophic failure model), there is a much smaller 
amount ofliterature on the reliability of repairable systems [ 6]. As a result of the reliability 
of repairable systems being an extension of the reliability of parts, the terminology can be 
very misleading. Quoting form Ascher and Feingold [2, page 133], " ... that the prevalent 
terminology could scarcely be more misleading if it had been designed to mislead --
specifically, it has engendered such deep-seated misconceptions that it is extraordinarily 
difficult to supplant it with improved nomenclature." This section attempts to clarify the 
terminology used in the study of repairable systems. 
A renewal process is used to model a system's reliability if it is restored to the 
level of a brand new system after repair. The phrase same-as-new is used to describe the 
result of a renewal process. Since a repaired system is in the same condition as a new 
system, a renewal process cannot be used to model a system that is experiencing reliability 
growth or deterioration. 
Systems for which reliability does not change after a repair, the appropriate model 
is the nonhomogenous Poisson process (NHPP). The term same-as-old or minimal repair 
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is used to describe a system that is in the same general condition after a repair as before 
the failure, except that the system can continue to operate after repair. 
The mathematics of a stochastic point process is used extensively to describe 
repairable systems. A point process [7] is intended to model a probabilistic experiment 
which places points on the time axes. These points ( often called arrivals), might be 
successive failures of a repairable system. Let N( t) be the number of arrivals on (0, t]. For 
example, N(t)=N(O,t], N(a,b]=N(b)-N(a) and N{a} is the number of arrivals at point "a". 
Formally, a stochastic point process {N(t)} is a collection of usually interrelated 
random variables ( failure times), each labeled by a point t on the positive line and such that 
N(t2)-N(t1) = N(t1, ti]. The quantity N(th ti] has probability one of being a finite 
nonegative integer for all ti>t 1 ~ O. A point process has a finite number of arrivals 
(failures) on a finite interval with a positive probability. Assume N(O)=O. A point process 
is said to have no simultaneous arrivals (failures) if, with probability one, each jump of 
N(t) is of unit magnitude. This excludes the possibility of having more than one failure at 
any instance in time. 
The failure intensity function or intensity function, denoted by u(t), is defined as 
( ) - 1. Pr{N(t + At)-N(t) ~ l} u t = 1m . 
t.HO At 2.1.3.1 
A point process is said to be orderly or regular if 
Pr{N(t + At)- N(t) ~ 2} = o(At), 2.1.3.2 
that is, if independent failures cannot occur simultaneously. The time t, called the global 
time, is the cumulative time since initial startup of the system, not the reset time used in 
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renewal theory after each failure. The quantity u( t )Lit is approximately the probability that 
a failure will occur in the interval (t,t+~t). 
For a stochastic point process, the rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF) is 
defined as 
d 
v(t) = -E[N(t)]. 
dt 
2.1.3.3 
For an orderly nonstationary point process, the intensity function u(t) and the ROCOF 
v(t) are equal, if they exist. The intensity function can be defined for any stochastic point 
process, not just the NHPP. The intensity functions u(t) and the ROCOF v(t) are the same 
as the peril rate p( t) for the NHPP. The terms failure or hazard rate, which are used to 
describe non-repairable part failures, should not be used to describe the intensity function, 
ROCOF or the peril rate for repairable systems. 
A decreasing peril rate with respect to time implies that the probability of failure 
during a fixed time interval is decreasing. This is the case for a system experiencing 
reliability growth. Reliability growth occurs when a system's design is steadily improved, 
thus making the system more reliable as time progresses. Reliability growth can also occur 
in operating systems when the maintenance program is sufficiently improved so that the 
reliability of the system improves. For systems that have an increasing peril rate with 
respect to time, reliability decreases with time. Here the probability of failure during a 
fixed time interval increases with time. Reliability deterioration indicates a system 
experiencing wearout. Deteriorating systems are candidates for preventive maintenance 
programs. 
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For a given global time t, the time interval from t to the previous failure is the 
backward recu"ence time, B{t), as shown in Figure 1. The backward recurrence time is 
defined as 
B(t) = t - XN(t) 2.1.3.4 
where XN<t> is the failure time Xi (i=l,2, ... final failure) just preceding the global time t. 
The time interval from time t to the next failure is the forward recu"ence time, W(t). The 
forward recurrence time is defined as 
W(t) = XN(t)+l - t 2.1.3.5 
where XN(t)+ 1 is the failure time after X . Another quantity of interest is the instantaneous 
mean time between failure {IMTBF). The IMTBF is defined as 
1 1 IMTBF{t) = - = -. 
.u(t) p(t) 2.1.3.6 
If the system is either deteriorating or experiencing reliability growth, IMTBF is time 
dependent. For a system described by a NHPP the peril rate is a time dependent quantity, 
therefore, the IMTBF is also a time dependent quantity. 
B(t1) W(t1) Y3,1 
,-
~14 ~14 ~1 
e X 6 6 ~ t 
t1 h X3,1 
S1 T1 
X1,1 
X2,1 
X3,1 
Figure 1. Sample path of a Stochastic Point Process 
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Figure 1 shows a sample realization for a stochastic point process; ~q measures 
the total time from zero to the i-th failure for the q-th system and is called an arrival time. 
To clarify the notation a comma is used between the subscripts on the arrival time indices, 
for example, X1,1 has a comma so that it is not confused with X11. The quantity Xiq is the 
same as ~q; however, in this case the comma is not required. Xiq is a random variable 
(RV) contrary to the situation where p parts are tested without replacement; in general 
there is no upper bound on i. The real variable t measures the total time since the start up 
of the process. The term global time is used for t. When k copies of a system are under 
study, tis measured independently for each copy. Yiq, i=l,2, ... Nq, q=l,2, ... k, is the 
interarrival time between the (i-1 )th and the i-th failures for the q-th system. The real 
variable Xiq measures the time elapsed since the most recent failure. The term local time is 
used for Xiq· The Xiq's are analogous to x for part models butt has no direct analogy in 
part modeling. The RV, Nq(t), is defined as the maximum value ofi for which Xiq~t, i.e., 
Nq{t) is the number of failures that occur during (O,t]. { Nq{t), t ~O} is the integer 
valued counting process that includes both the number of failures in (O,t], Nq(t), and the 
instants X1q, X2q, ... , at which they occur. 
The quantity S1, or in general Sq, is the value oft for which the first (q=l) system's 
observation period begins. T1 is the value oft for which the first (q=l) observation interval 
ends. Usually, a system cannot be monitored for an indefinite period of time. Therefore, 
the observation period is a finite period of time where the failure times are recorded for 
the system under study. 
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2.2 Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process 
To develop the NHPP, the homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) must first be 
explained [2,8]. The HPP can be defined as a nonterminating sequence of independent and 
identically exponentially distributed Yiq's. More formally, the counting process {Nq(t), t 
~O} is said to be HPP if 
(a) N(O)=O, 
(b) {Nq( t ), t ~ 0} has independent increments, and 
(c) the number of events (failures) in any interval oflength (h-t1) has a Poisson 
distribution with mean [ (p )( t 2 - t 1) ] . For all ti>t 1 ~ 0 and j ~ 0 
From condition ( c) it follows that E{N(t2-t1) }=[ (p )( t 2 - t 1 ) ] where the constant, p, is the 
rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF). The HPP is characterized by times between 
failures that are independent and identically distributed with an exponential distribution. 
Since HPP has stationary, independent increments, then v(t)= p =1/E[X]. From this 
definition, the reliability function is given by 
2.2.2 
The NHPP differs from the HPP only in that the ROCOF varies with time rather 
than being constant. For the NHPP conditions, (a) and (b) are retained, and condition (c) 
becomes (c'). The number of failures in any interval (t1,h) has a Poisson distribution with 
mean 
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2.2.3 
. exp(-(2 p(t)dt){(2 p(t)dt}j 
Pr{N(t2 )-N(t1 ) = J}= .1 . J. 2.2.4 
From condition ( c') it follows that 
2.2.5 
The reliability function for the NHPP is 
2.2.6 
The change in statement (c') results in the Yi's that are neither independent nor 
identically distributed; neither are they independent samples from any other single 
distribution. Therefore, any statistical techniques which are based on the assumption that 
the data are independent and identically distributed (IID) cannot be validly applied to an 
NHPP. Howev~r, due to condition (b), the NHPP retains the independent increments 
property. If a counting process has independent increments, then the number of failures in 
an interval is not influenced by the number of failures which occurred in any "strictly 
earlier" interval, i.e., with no overlap. For the NHPP model of a repairable system, the 
time variant ROCOF, p(t), is referred to as the peril rate rather than the hazard or failure 
rate for non-repairable parts. 
2.2. l Power Law Process 
The term Power Law Process refers to a specific mathematical form of the 
intensity function for a NHPP. The intensity function u(t), same as p(t) in this case, is 
given by 
p(t) = u(t) = 1..J3t1H, t > 0 2.2.1.1 
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where 1..,J3 > 0 and tis the age of the system [2]. The parameter J3 is called the shape 
parameter, and A. is the scale parameter. The mathematical form for the intensity function 
( called power law) is the same as the failure rate for a Weibull distribution. 
The NHPP with a power law intensity function is commonly referred to as a 
"Weibull Process". The "Weibull Process" is not the same as a Weibull distribution. This 
terminology leads to confusion with the Weibull distribution. The Weibull distribution is 
used for time to first failure of a non-repairable system. The hazard rate is a relative rate of 
failure for non-repairable systems and the intensity function is an absolute rate of failure 
for repairable systems. 
The intensity function u(t) given in 2.2.1.1 is only one mathematical form of the 
intensity function; other forms [9,10] are in use. The power law mean value function for 
the NHPP with intensity 2.2.1.1 is 
E[N(t)] = A.t 13 , t > 0. 2.2.1.2 
This is the expected number of failures for a system during its age (O,t). The probability 
that a failure will occur during the interval {t, t+At) is approximately u(t)At. 
The NHPP reduces to the homogeneous Poisson process when J3 = 1. This is the 
case where the intensity function does not change as the system ages. For J3 > 1, the 
intensity function u(t) is strictly increasing. In this case, the system has a wearout 
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characteristic and the intervals between successive failures Xi and Xi-1 are stochastically 
decreasing. When the intervals between successive failures are stochastically decreasing, 
the expected number of failures in at least one suitably chosen later interval must be 
strictly greater than the expected number in an initial interval of the same length. For P < 
1, the intensity function is strictly decreasing. This occurs during the debugging phase of a 
system's development, or for mature systems this occurs as a result ofimproved 
maintenance practices. As a result of the associated increased reliability, the intervals 
between successive failures Xi - Xi-1 will stochastically increase. 
The NHPP is used to analyze the reliability of a system based on failure data 
obtained from k copies of the system operating under the same environmental conditions. 
It is assumed that the failures for each of the k systems is governed by a peril rate given by 
p(t) = 1..pt 13- 1 · The values of A and P will be estimated based on the data for the k systems. 
The system is observed continuously from time Sq to time Tq, (q = 1,2, ... ,k). Over the 
interval [Sq,, Tq], let Nq be the total number of failures experienced by the q-th system 
and let Xiq be the time at which the i-th failure occurs, ( i = 1,2, ... ,Nq; q = 1,2, ... ,k). 
For the observation interval [Sq,, Tq], the times Sq,Tq,, q = 1,2, ... ,k, may be 
observed failure times for the q-th system. The time of the last failure determines if the 
data are time or failure truncated. If the last failure occurs at the end of the observation 
interval, XNq,q = Tq, then the data on the q-th system are said to be failure truncated. In 
this case, Tq, is a random variable with Nq fixed. If the last observed failure occurs prior 
to the end of the observation interval, XNq,q < Tq, the data on the q-th system are said to 
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be time truncated. For time truncated data, Nq is a random variable. To illustrate the 
notation, in Figure 2 the values for Sq, Tq, Nq, and Xiq are shown for three IDGs. 
The method of Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) [11] is used to determine 
estimates of A and p for a homogeneous population ofk systems. Let the q-th system be 
A A 
observed from time Sq to Tq, (q = 1,2, ... ,k). The MLE of A and p arei and P 
respectively and are given by 
2.2.1.4 
q=l 
2.2.1.5 
q=l q=l i=l 
In equation 2.2.1.5, when (O·lnO) is encountered, it is set equal to zero. Since these 
A' A 
equations cannot in general be solved for A and p , an iterative approach is used. 
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Figure 2. Maintenance Time Line for Three IDGs 
Once the estimates of A and f3 are obtained, they are used to estimate the peril rate. 
The peril rate based on MLE is given by 
p(t) = i~t~-l. 2.2.1.6 
In addition to the MLE estimate of the peril rate, the nonparametric natural 
estimate of the peril rate may be calculated [12]. The natural estimate of the peril rate is 
given by 
N. 
pi(t) = A J ' 
ot. 
J 
2.2.1.7 
where Nj is the number of failures in each observation cell interval and Litj is given by 
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Atj = ~)min(Ti,Ij+1)- max(Ij,SJ]. 2.2.1.8 
iE[Ij,Ii+t1 
Note that since equation 2.2.1.8 sums over all k systems, therefore, the total number of 
units operational during the j-th observation cell are taken into account. A typical 
observation cell is shown in Figure 2. An observation cell ( or frequency cell) is the time 
interval between Ij and Ij+1. The number and width of the observation cells is determined 
by the preference of the investigator. In this study the natural estimate of the peril rate is 
determined by using five equally spaced observation cells. This choice results in at least 
five failures per observation cell so that the Chi-Squared goodness-of-fit test can be used 
for the NHPP estimate. 
The terms observation interval and observation cell should not be confused. The 
observation interval [Sq, Tq] is the length of time over which the failures and subsequent 
maintenance actions are observed. The observation cell [Ij, Ij+i] is a subdivision of the 
observation interval used for the purpose of failure data analysis . 
. 2.2.2 Comparison of Hazard and Peril Rates 
Since the hazard rate for parts and the peril rate for repairable systems are very 
similar concepts, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the two [ 6]. When a part is 
tested, usually several parts are placed on test at the same time. In this case, it is 
reasonable to assume that the random lifetimes of the parts on test are independent and 
identically distributed (IID). The goal of the test is to determine the PDF that best 
describes the lifetimes. The lifetimes are observed from the shortest to longest. For a 
simple repairable system, the times to failure and repair form a sequence of numbers from 
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shortest to the longest. However, in the case of a repairable system, the IID assumption is 
not valid. With a repairable system, reliability growth or deterioration with time causes the 
intrinsic properties of the system to change. In other words, the time between the third and 
fourth failures is not independent of the time between the second and third failures. Also, 
the times between failures are not identically distributed since the system changes in time. 
The quantity p( t )dt is interpreted as the unconditional probability that a failure, not 
necessarily the first, occurs in (t,t+dt). This is in contrast to the interpretation ofhx(x)dx 
which is the conditional probability of first and only failure in (x,x+dx], given survival to x. 
The survival condition to x is essential since it is meaningless to consider the probability of 
failure of a part after time x, if it has already failed and been discarded before that time. 
2.3 Statistical Tests 
2.3.1 Cramer-Von Mises Goodness-of-Fit Test 
The Cramer-Von Mises (CVM) test provides a formal basis for evaluating the 
NHPP power law intensity function model goodness-of-fit. Let the available data for the 
q-th system over the interval [O, T q], with successive failure times be 
' O<X 1,q<X2,q< ... <XNq,q~Tq, (q=l, ... ,k). For the CVM test [11,13] the following steps 
are undertaken: 
Step 1. For failure truncated data, XNq,q=Tq, let Mq = Nq - 1. For time truncated data, 
XNq,q~T q, let Mq = Nq. Next calculate Musing 
2.3.1.1 
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Step 2. For each system divide each successive failure time by the corresponding end of 
the observation interval time T q, i= 1, ... ,Mq. 
xiq 
yiq = T' i=l, ... ,Mq, (q=l, ... k) 
q 
2.3.1.2 
Step 3. Calculate the unbiased estimate f3 of P from 
M-1 
P= k Mq T 
1:1:ln(-q) 
q=l i=l xiq 
2.3.1.3 
Step 4. Treat the M Yiq's as one ordered group from the smallest to the largest. Call the 
ordered values Z1,Z2, ... ,ZM, where, Z1<Z2< ... <ZM. · 
Step 5. Calculate the parametric Cramer-Von Mises statistic [11,13] 
cz =-1-+ ~[z~ _ 2j-1]2 
M 12M f:t J 2M 2.3.1.4 
Step 6. For the desired significance level and the M value, there is a corresponding critical 
value that appears in reference [ 11]. 
Step 7. If the calculated C!t (from step 5) is less than the critical value from step 6 then 
the hypothesis must be accepted that the failure times for the k systems follow a NHPP 
with intensity function 
p(t) = u(t) = AJ3t 1H. 2.3.1.5 
2.3.2 Chi-squared Goodness-of-Fit Test 
21 
Unlike the Cramer-Von Mises test, the Chi-squared test does not require that the 
observation interval start times Sq be O for each of the k systems. The Chi-squared test 
[14,15] uses the fact that the expected number of failures for a system over an interval 
(a,b) is estimated by 
2.3.2.1 
The steps for the Chi-squared Test are as follows: 
Step 1. Use the MLE technique to estimate the values of).. and fl Represent the MLE 
" " 
values of ).. and f3 by ).. and f3 respectively. 
Step 2. Divide the observation interval into at least three cell intervals. The lengths of the 
cell intervals do not have to be equal. Let d represent the number of cell intervals. 
Step 3. Calculate the expected number of failures in each of the cell intervals, 0(i). Where 
0(j) is given by 
0(j) = t { i[min(T;,Ij+i)J13 -i[max(Ij,S;)]~} . 
t=l 
2.3.2.2 
For example, in Figure 2, since SK is greater than Ij, then the cell interval begins at SK 
rather than Ij for this system. If the number of expected failures is not at least five, then the 
interval cell should be lengthened so that the expected number of failures is at least five. It 
has been found empirically that the expected number of failures per interval cell must be at 
least five for the Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test to be valid [16]. 
Step 4. Determine the number of observed failures N(i) in the cell intervals. Using Figure 2 
as an example, there are three failures in this cell interval. 
Step 5. Compute the X, 2 statistic [14,15] 
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x2 = f [N(j)A-0(j)]2 
£... S(J') j=l 
2.3.2.3 
Step 6. Compare the computed value of x2 with the tabulated percentiles [14] for a Chi-
squared variate, using df = d-2 degrees of freedom. Values of x2 from step 5 that are 
greater than the x 2 percentiles from Chi-squared tables indicate that the observed data 
contradicts the power law model. 
2.3.3 Test for Trend and Confidence Bounds 
The conditional l\.1LE of P , P , is used to test for trend and to construct 
conditional confidence bounds on the true value of P [2, 17]. To accomplish this, it is 
observed that 
2.3.3.1 
is distributed as a Chi-squared random variable with 2M degrees of freedom. The 
conditional l\.1LE of P , p , is given by 
2.3.3.2 
where Mq=Nq if the data for the q-th system are time truncated and Mq=Nq-1 if the data 
are failure truncated. M is defined as 
2.3.3.3 
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Mis the effective total number of failures for the k systems. To test for trend, use the null 
hypothesis of an HPP or P = 1. This reduces equation 2. 3. 3. 1 to the test statistic 
referenced in MIL-HDBK-189 [13]. To reject the null hypothesis ofHPP, the value ofU 
must be greater or smaller than the critical values given for Chi-squared distributed data 
with ~M degrees of freedom at a given significance level. These relationships can also be 
written [ 11] in terms of the unbiased estimate of P given by 
- M-1-
P=-P. 
M 
2.3.3.4 
The unbiased estimate of P is used to construct the confidence intervals on the 
shape parameter P . The exact (1-a) 100 percent lower and upper confidence bounds on 
Pare 
-X2 (%,2M) 
PL= p 2(M-1) 
- X 2 (1-% ,2M) 
Pu = p 2(M - 1) ' 
2.3.3.5 
2.3.3.6 
where x 2 ( y ,2M) is the y -th percentile for the Chi-squared distribution with 2M degrees 
of freedom. 
2.4 Example of a Repairable System 
An example of a repairable system is presented to illustrate the material previously 
developed. The example is from L.H. Crow [17]. Suppose there are k=3 systems observed 
over the interval [O,T]; that is, the data are time truncated with Tq=200, q=l,2,3. The 
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failure data were simulated on a computer with 'A, =O. 6 and P =O. 5. The results are given 
in Table I. 
TABLE I 
SIMULATED FAILURE DATA SET 
System 1 System 2 System 3 
xil Xi2 xi3 
4.3 0.1 8.4 
4.4 5.6 32.5 
10.2 18.6 44.7 
23.5 19.5 48.4 
23.8 24.2 50.6 
26.4 26.7 73.6 
74.0 45.1 98.7 
77.1 45.8 112.2 
92.1 75.7 129.8 
197.2 79.7 136.0 
98.6 195.8 
120.1 
161.8 
180.6 
190.8 
Using the failure data presented in Table I, the MATLAB computer program 
THPERIL.M (Appendix D.1 ), and the input data set RMCROWTl .DAT (Appendix D.3), 
the systems can be analyzed. The numerical values presented in this example are from the 
output of the program THPERIL.M and agree with the values presented in reference 17. 
The output from program THPERIL.M is given in Appendix D.2. The 'A, and P 
parameters are calculated iteratively using equations 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.1.5. The results are 
A A 
'A, =0.4605 and p =0.6153. Since beta is less than one, this indicates a system showing 
reliability growth with time. 
The natural estimate of the peril rate is determined by applying equations 2.2.1.7 
and 2.2.1.8 to the failure data. To illustrate the calculation of pj ( t) , the results of 
program THPERIL.M presented in Appendix D.2 can be used. The program divides the 
failure data into five equally spaced intervals. In this example the first interval is [0,40). 
During this interval there are 14 failures with three operational units. Using equation 
2.2.1. 7 the natural estimate of the peril rate becomes 
pi(t) = N 1 = 14 = 0.1167, for O :s; t < 40. 
Litl 40+40+40 
The natural and NHPP estimates of the peril rate are given in Figure 3. The IMTBF 
defined in equation 2.1.3.6 is shown in Figure 4. 
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To test the hypothesis that the failure data follow a NHPP with a power law 
intensity function, the Chi-squared and Cramer-Von Mises goodness-of-fit tests are used. 
First consider the Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. For example, the expected number of 
failures during the second cell interval [ 40,80) is determined by evaluating equation 
2.3.2.2 for j=2, this is 
The expected number of failures during the second interval cell is 0 (2)=7.1128. Once the 
0 G)'s are calculated the Chi-squared statistic can be calculated using equation 2.3.2.3. 
This becomes 
2 (14 - 13.37)2 (10- 7.11)2 ( 4 - 5.8) 2 (3 - 5.09) 2 
X = + + +----
13.37 7.11 5.8 5.09 
+ (5 - 4.62)2 = 2.65. 
4.62 
The calculated value of the Chi-squared statistic must now be compared with the critical 
values for the Chi-squared Distribution given in reference 14. For three degrees of 
freedom, (df=5-2=3) at the 0.05 significance level, the critical value of the Chi-squared 
distribution is 7.81. Since 2.65<7.81, the hypothesis is satisfied that the failure data 
follows a NHPP with a power law intensity function. 
The Cramer-Von Mises goodness-of-fit test can also be used to test the NHPP 
hypothesis for the failure data points. The procedures to use this test are outlined in 
section 2.3.1. The first parameter calculated is M, which is 10+ 15+ 11 =36. since the data 
are time truncated, Mis the number of total failures. Using equation 2.3.1.3, the unbiased 
estimate of f3 is f3 =O. 5982. The value of the Cramer-Von Mises statistic is found using 
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equation 2.3.1.4. Evaluating this equation yields C;6 =0.0695. The critical values for C~ 
are found in Table 2 of reference 17. The critical value at O. 05 level of significance for 
M=36 is 0.213. Since 0.0695 is less than 0.213, the hypothesis can be accepted that the 
data are NHPP with a power law intensity at this significance level. 
The failure data are now tested for trend. To accomplish this, the statistic U 
defined by equation 2. 3. 3 .1 is evaluated. The value of the conditional MLE of f3 , f3 , is 
found by rearranging equation 2.3.3.4. The statistic U is calculated using 
U = 2Mf3 = 2(M- l)f3 = 2(36-1)(0.6153) = 72 . (~)P p o.s982 
M-1 
The value ofU must now be compared with x2(y = 0.95,df = 2 *36). Since many 
[8,14,16,18] Chi-squared tables do not cover 72 degrees of freedom, an approximation 
must be used. The equation used in the approximation of the percentiles of the Chi-
squared distribution is given by [18] 
[ ]
3 
2 2 112 
X, 2 = df 1--+z(-) 
9df 9df 
2.4.1 
where z is a standardized normal random variable. For a 0.05 significance level, z=l .645 
[18]. Using z=l.645 and df=72, x 2 using equation 2.4.1 is 92.8. Since U=72 is less than 
92.8, it is concluded that the failure data shows trend with a f3 less than one. 
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The lower and upper confidence bounds for P are calculated using equations 
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2.3.3.5 and 2.3.3.6, respectively. For a significance level of a =0.1 and M=36, the values 
of x. 2 become x. 2 (.I I 2,2 *36) = 53.4 and x. 2 (1-.l I 2,2 *36) = 92.8. These x. 2 values 
were calculated using the approximation equation 2.4.1 and z=0.645 for x. 2 =92.8 and z=-
1.645 for x. 2 =53.4. Using these Chi-squared values, p =0.5982 and M=36 in equations 
2.3.3.5 and 2.3.3.6, the lower and upper confidence bounds on P are PL =0.456 and 
Pu=0.793. 
2.5 Type II Maintenance Policy 
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The Type II maintenance policy was introduced by Barlow and Hunter [ 19] in 
1960. This policy calls for a planned replacement (overhaul) of a system after some 
prespecified number of system operating hours, regardless of the number of intervening 
failures. It is assumed that after each failure. the system is only minimally repaired, 
therefore, the ROCOF is unchanged by the repair. An operational system is removed from 
service to be overhauled when it has reached a prespecified number of hours. 
Instantaneous repair is also assumed. The Type ll policy is the same as a hard-time 
replacement policy commonly used in the airline industry. 
Since scheduled overhauls occur at times T, 2T, 3T, ... , the problem reduces to 
selecting T to minimize the overall maintenance cost function. The long-run expected cost 
per unit time is given by [20] 
2.5.1 
where E[N(T)] is the expected number of minimal repairs over the interval and is given by 
E[N(T)] = Jp(u)du. 2.5.2 
CMR is the cost of a minimum repair performed after a failure. This cost does not include 
the cost of an overhaul. CsR is the cost of a scheduled overhaul. Combining the power law 
peril rate given by equation 2.2.1.6 and equations 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, the long-run expected 
cost per unit time becomes 
2.5.3 
To minimize C(T), set the derivative of equation 2.5.1 with respect to T equal to 
0. The resulting equation is 
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IT C (p(T)-p(u))du = -.sR . 
o C MR 
2.5.4 
This equation has a unique solution provided the peril rate is strictly increasing to oo as 
t ~ oo . When the peril rate is specifically in the form 
p(t) = A~tP-t ,~ > 1, 2.5.5 
the optimal replacement interval T* becomes 
[ ]
11p 
T*- CSR 
A(~ -l)CMR 2.5.6 
2.6 Type II' Maintenance Policy 
The Type II' maintenance policy was first introduced by Makabe and Morimura 
[21] in 1963. The Type II' policy is : "Perform preventive maintenance at the next failure 
after T operating hours [22]." Preventive maintenance can consist of system replacement 
or overhaul. A Type II' maintenance policy is the same as a mandatory soft-time overhaul 
interval maintenance policy. The soft-time overhaul policy is commonly used in the airline 
maintenance industry. The original papers by Makabe and Morimura were primarily 
concerned with the comparison of Type I through V maintenance policies. 
In 1977 Muth [4] extended the earlier work ofMakabe and Morimura. Muth 
assumes: 
1. A replacement resets the age of the system to O. 
2. A repair does not change the age of the system. 
3. When a system fails it is repaired ift<T, or replaced ift>=T. 
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In the above, tis the system age, and Tis the overhaul interval. The long-run expected 
cost per unit time is given by 
C(T) = CUSOVH + CMR H(T) . 
T+r(T) 2.6.1 
Where, CusoVH is the cost of an overhaul at failure given the t>T, CMR is the cost of a 
minimal repair, and H(T) is defined as 
H(T) = E{NJ = J~(x)dx. 2.6.2 
In this equation, h(x) is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process rate function, and Ni is the 
number of failures that occur in (ti, ti+T). The quantity r(T) is the mean residual life 
function (m.r.1.f) defined in equation 2.1.2.6. 
The shortcoming with Muth's approach is that the m.r.1.f does not accurately 
represent the expected time remaining to the next failure when the system has age T. The 
m.r.1.f is a concept based on a lifetime distribution function and is used for a parts model 
to estimate the remaining life of the part once it has reached a specific age. The m.r.1.f. is 
not defined for a repairable system. Since a repairable system's failure time is more 
accurately characterized by a NHPP than a distribution function, a Monte Carlo simulation 
will be needed to determine the IDG' s optimum replacement interval, T*, under a Type II' 
maintenance policy. 
2. 7 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation [23] has been successfully used in the past to model 
repairable systems. Kumamoto et al. [24] investigated the use of a state-transition Monte 
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Carlo method to estimate the unreliability oflarge repairable systems. Roberts and Mann 
[25] modeled failure data with Crow's nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The 
expected number of failures predicted for the system by the Crow model was compared 
with predictions using a Monte Carlo simulation that utilized Weibull parameters for the 
major components of the system. Calabria et al. [26] used Monte Carlo simulation to 
assess the performance of point maximum likelihood estimators for parameters, e.g., mean 
number of failures and failure rate in a nonhomogeneous Poisson process, for in-service 
failure count data. 
2.8 Availability 
Reliability is a measure of the probability that the system has operated successfully 
over the time interval from O to t. The definition of reliability does not take into account 
the maintenance program of the system. Once a system is fully operational and is subject 
to a maintenance program, the total costs of the system is determined by the operational 
and maintenance costs. Availability combines a measure of the maintainability and 
reliability and is widely used to measure the effectiveness of maintained systems. 
Availability is defined as the probability that the system is operating successfully at 
any point in time under stated conditions [3], or it is defined as the ratio of uptime to total 
time [27]. Based on this broad definition, availability can be more exactly defined by six 
definitions [27]. The first three depend on the time interval considered. The last three 
definitions depend on the type of downtime. The six definitions for availability are: 
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1. Instantaneous Availability, A(t), is defined as the probability that the system is 
operational at any random time t. This is the same as pointwise availability defined in 
Barlow and Proschan [20]. 
2. Average Uptime Availability, A't(t), is the proportion of time in a specified interval 
(0, 't) that the system is available for use, and it is given by 
1 i't A't('t) = - A(t)dt. 
't 0 
2.8.1 
This is the same term as interval availability defined by Barlow and Proschan [20]. 
3. Steady State Availability, Ass (oo), is defined when the time interval considered is very 
large and is given by 
A ss ( oo) = lim A ( 't) 
't~OO 2.8.2 
This is the same as the limiting interval availability defined by Barlow and Prochan [20]. 
4. Inherent Availability, A, is defined by 
A.= MTBF 
1 MTBF+MTTR 
2.8.3 
where MTBF = mean time between failure and MTTR = mean time to repair. This 
definition includes only corrective maintenance downtime and excludes ready time, 
preventive maintenance downtime, logistic ( or supply) time, and waiting or administrative 
downtime. 
5. Achieved Availability, Aa, includes corrective and preventive maintenance downtime 
and is a function of the frequency of maintenance and the mean maintenance time. It is 
defined by 
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A = MTBM 
• MTBM+MMD 
2.8.4 
where MTBM = mean time between maintenance and MMD = mean maintenance 
downtime resulting form both corrective and preventive maintenance actions. This 
definition excludes logistic time and waiting or administrative downtime. 
6. Operational Availability, A,, includes ready time, logistic time, and waiting time or 
administrative time and is expressed by 
A = MTBM + ready time 
0 (MTBM + ready time) + MMD + delay time 2.8.5 
where ready time = operational cycle - MTBM - MMD - delay time. 
To describe the availability of a system, it is necessary to specify three things: the 
component(s) failure process; the repair or maintenance process; and system configuration 
[28] which describes how the components are functionally connected and the rules of 
operation. The effects of these three items·must be investigated before a meaningful 
availability model is applied. 
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CHAPTER ill 
REDUCTION OF FAILURE DATA 
This chapter begins by investigating the dominant failure modes of the IDG. An 
understanding of the dominant failure modes is important to improve the intrinsic 
reliability [29] of a system. Next, the failure data is characterized using the NHPP and 
natural estimate methods. Due to the "bathtub" shape of the peril rate, the failure data are 
left-truncated to remove the infant mortality effects. A quantification of the peril rate is 
necessary to develop an optimal maintenance program. 
3 .1 Integrated Drive Generator 
The purpose of the integrated drive generator is to provide primary electrical power 
for the aircraft. The IDG is broken down into two main subsystems (see Figure 5): the 
constant speed drive (CSD) and the generator. 
The CSD is a hydromechanical device whose major components are an axial gear 
differential, a mechanical governor, a charge pump, a scavenge/inversion pump, two 
hydraulic pump and motor assemblies, and an electrically actuated input shaft disconnect. 
The generator converts the 12,000 rpm mechanical output power of the CSD into 3 phase 
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400 Hz electrical power. The generator is a brushless, three-stage, rotating rectifier type 
of generator. The roto~ assembly contains the exciter rotor, permanent magnet generator 
rotor, main generator rotor, and rotating rectifier assembly. The stators for the permanent 
magnet generator, main generator, and exciter are mounted in the IDG housing. The 
permanent magnet generator provides a signal used for system control, protection, and 
generator excitation. External to the IDG is the generator control unit (GCU). The GCU 
provides excitation to the generator and in conjunction with switches on the flight deck 
panels, provides control, protection, and metering for the generator and load buses. 
Integrated Drive Generator 
4soo- r--------------------1 
,.-----~ 9200 I 12000 I 
rpm I rpm I 
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engine drive I 
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Figure 5. Integrated Drive Generator 
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3.2 Description of Failure Data 
To increase the mean time between failure (MTBF) of a population of systems 
there are two fundamental approaches. The first is to improve the intrinsic reliability of the 
individuals in the population; this is accomplished through implementation of product 
improvement service bulletins and improved repair procedures. The second approach is to 
modify the scheduled maintenance interval so that for a deteriorating system, the average 
age of the population decreases, thus increasing the MTBF. An investigation of the 
dominant fault modes provides information useful in improving the intrinsic reliability of 
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the IDG. The dominant fault modes are identified in this section. This information is useful 
to focus engineering efforts on the most common or costly problems. 
Appendix A contains a list of 84 maintenance events that occurred on 61 separate 
IDG's [30]. The first column, labeled TRK#, is the unique tracking number of the IDG; 
this gives each IDG a distinct label. The second column, labeled HOURS SINCE OVH, is 
the number of flight hours (FH) on each drive since it was overhauled ( 'tTsoq ). Each IDG 
in Appendix A has been through at least one overhaul. During an overhaul the IDG is 
returned to the manufacturer's original fits and tolerances, and the number of hours on the 
unit is returned to zero. The third column, labeled HOURS SINCE LAST FAILURE, 
gives the number of flight hours since the unit's last failure. When the HOURS SINCE 
OVH and HOURS SINCE LAST FAILURE are equal, this represents the first failure of 
the drive since overhaul. The fourth column, labeled FAILURE MODE, contains the type 
of failure each drive experienced. A detailed discussion of each failure mode is beyond the 
scope of this Thesis. The fifth column, labeled TYPE OF MAINT., contains the type of 
maintenance performed on each drive to return it to service. 
The type of maintenance to be performed is largely determined by the mechanic in 
the repair facility. The least involved type of maintenance is a No Fault Found (NFF). In a 
NFF, the drive is initially functionally tested, and if all the functional tests are passed, no 
maintenance is performed, and the drive is returned to inventory for future use. A Check 
and Repair (C&R) maintenance action occurs when an actual fault is present and can be 
repaired without a complete overhaul of the IDG. The most extensive form of 
maintenance is the overhaul (OVH). During an overhaul, a predetermined bill-of-work is 
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performed on the drive to return it to the manufacturer's original fits and tolerances. 
Unlike the NFF or C&R, the overhaul resets the number of flight hours on the drive to 
zero ( 'tTsoq = 0). 
Table II summarizes the data from Appendix A. The most common type of failure 
and maintenance action is the NFF. The high unconfirmed removal percentage is a result 
of the troubleshooting time constraints placed on an aircraft mechanic. Since most aircraft 
maintenance is performed between flights or during overnight maintenance, many 
components (such as the IDG) are unnecessarily replaced. The most common confirmed 
failure mode is CARRIER SHAFT ASSY. The most common type of maintenance 
resulting from this type of failure is an overhaul. Averaging the hours since overhaul in 
Table II gives 5858 FH. The average FH since overhaul for the CARRIER SHAFT ASSY 
failure mode is 6680 FH. Since the 6680 FH is significantly higher than the hours since 
overhaul for the general population, this would indicate that the CARRIER SHAFT ASSY 
failure mode is associated with a wear out process. 
TABLE II 
FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
AVG HOURS AVG HOURS MOST COMMON 
FAILURE MODE SINCE OVERHAUL SINCE FAILURE PERCENT MAINTENANCE 
NFF 5405 3141 29.8 NFF 
CARRIER 6680 5633 14.3 OVH 
SHAFT ASSY 
PUMP&MOTOR 5833 4313 11.9 OVH 
-ASSYFIXED 
END 
STATOR 7008 5589 9.5 C&R 
HOUSING ASSY 
ALL OTHERS 5599 4512 34.5 VARIOUS 
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3.3 Overview of Field Maintenance Data 
Appendix C gives the maintenance history of 41 IDGs. The first column labeled 
TRAK# is a unique number given to each IDG. The tracking numbers are not sequential 
so that they remain consistent with reference 30. The next eight columns labeled 1 ST 
INTVL through 8 TH INTVL are maintenance actions that occurred to each drive. For 
example, 74-E represents 74 flight hours and an engine change. When an IDG is removed 
from service because the engine it is mounted to requires maintenance, no IDG 
maintenance is performed. The "-C" following the number of flight hours is for a C&R 
maintenance; "-0" is for an overhaul; and "-N' is for a no fault found (NFF) repair. A 
check and repair (C&R) maintenance action is considered a minimal repair [2]. Each drive 
was overhauled prior to the 1 ST INTVL flight hours and maintenance action. The column 
labeled FINAL INTVL is the number of flight hours on a drive from the last maintenance 
action to the end of the observation interval. These are time truncated data, i.e., the drives 
had not yet reached the point of an overhaul by the end of the data recording period. 
3 .4 Reduction of Failure Data 
Appendix B gives the maintenance history of 51 IDG's. These are the same IDG's 
from Appendix A. Only 51 of the 61 entries listed in Appendix A had sufficient 
maintenance history information to be included in Appendix B. When comparing the times 
to failure for a specific tracking number between Appendixes A and B, one notices slight 
differences in the number of flight hours. These differences are a result of two different 
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recording methods for the number of flight hours. The first column in Appendix B, labeled 
TRK#, is the IDG's unique tracking number. The second column, labeled INITIAL 
INTVL, is the total number of flight hours the drive has accumulated since the drive was 
originally purchased. The INITIAL INTVL value is the estimated total number of flight 
hours from the original purchase date of the drive to the date the data collection effort 
started. On the average, each drive accumulates 8 FH per day of life. This average 
includes periods of inactivity for maintenance and inventory. While in service, each drive 
accumulates 11. 3 9 FH for each calendar day of operation. An R in this or any column in 
Appendix B indicates that the information is not available. 
The third column, labeled O TH MAINT, is the first recorded maintenance event at 
the beginning of the observation interval. The fourth through eleventh columns contain the 
number of flight hours since the last maintenance event occurred. The letter following the 
flight hours represents the type of maintenance that occurred. The abbreviations used for 
each maintenance action are described in section 3.3 of this Thesis. 
The last column in Appendix B, labeled FINAL INTVL, is the estimated number 
of flight hours the IDG experiences since the last maintenance event. This number is 
determined by taking the difference between the dates the IDG was returned to service 
and the end of the observation interval multiplied by 11.39 FH/day. 
To clarify the information in Appendix B, take the second IDG as an example. On 
the date the observation period started for drive number 2, it had accumulated 
approximately 23,904 FH. Since an R appears in the third column, the maintenance event 
is unknown. After the 0-th maintenance occurred, the drive was placed back in service and 
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accumulated 2943 FH. At the time ofthis first failure, 'trr(q=Z> = 23904 + 2943 = 26847 
FH and 'tTSo(q=Z> was unknown. The quantitytrrq is the total time since the drive was 
originally placed in service. 'trrq is not reset to zero by an overhaul. After overhaul 
'tTso(q=z> is set to zero. The drive is returned to service and accumulated an additional 178 
FH. At this point the drive is removed from service for an engine change. After the 
engine's maintenance is completed, the IDG is returned to service with no maintenance 
being performed on it. Next the IDG operates for 9616 FH, fails, and is overhauled. The 
drive then accumulates 1830 FH and is removed from the engine due to an apparent 
failure. The drive is sent to the repair facility where it is tested with no fault found (NFF). 
Next the drive is returned to service and flies for 262 more hours until the end of the 
observation interval is reached. At the end of the observation interval, the times on the 
IDG are: 'trr(q=Z> = 23904 + 2943 + 178 + 9616 + 1830 + 262 = 38733 FH and 'tTso(q=Z> 
= 1830 + 262 = 2092 FH. Figure 6 gives a time line for this series of events up to 35,000 
FH. 
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Figure 6. Maintenance Events for the First Three IDG's 
3. 5 Effect of Overhaul on the IDG 
To develop a cost effective maintenance program, it is necessary to know if the 
system deteriorates or shows reliability growth with time. The time dependence of the 
peril rate determines if a system is deteriorating or improving with time. If the system's 
peril rate increases with time, then the system is deteriorating. Reliability growth is 
indicated by a decreasing peril rate. Once the type of system ( deteriorating or improving) 
is determined, then an optimal maintenance program [2] can be devised to decrease the 
total maintenance costs and increase the system's availability. In this section, the peril rate 
of the IDG is investigated. The NHPP with a power law intensity function is used to 
characterize the failure data. It is assumed that the IDG population is homogeneous, and 
therefore the failure data can be pooled [31]. 
Depending on how the failure data are combined, there are two peril rates that are 
of practical use. The first is the confirmed peril rate, Pc· Here the flight hours between 
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removals, shown in Appendix C, for the engine change and the NFF failures are added to 
the total time to failure. The confirmed peril rate represents only actual or confirmed IDG 
failures. For example, the IDG with tracking #1 in Appendix Chas the following failure 
data set: X1,1=74+138+1444=1656, X2,1=1656+2015+3966+712+1697=10046, and 
X3,1=10046+329=10375. The second peril rate takes into account the confirmed failures 
as well as the NFF failures. This is called the unconfirmed peril rate and is represented by 
{Jue. An unconfirmed IDG failure results in.a NFF maintenance action. There is a cost 
associated with a NFF maintenance action. The removal of the IDG for an engine change 
is not considered in either the confirmed or unconfirmed peril rates. Redoing the previous 
example for tracking #1, the sequence of failure times become: X1,1=74+138=212, 
X2,1=212+1444=1656, X3,1=1656+2015+3966+712+1697=10046, and 
Xi,1=10046+ 329=10375. 
PERIL RATE LEFT-TRUN. 
CONFIRMED 0 
UNCONFIRMED 0 
CONFIRMED 2000 
UNCONFIRMED 2000 
CONFIRMED 3000 
UNCONFIRMED 3000 
CONFIRMED 4000 
UNCONFIRMED 4000 
CONFIRMED 5000 
UNCONFIRMED 5000 
TABLE III 
NHPP PERIL RATES 
BETA LAMBDA 
.933 3.78E-4 
.793 1.8E-3 
1.3 l.27E-5 
1.27 2.08E-5 
1.74 l.97E-7 
1.65 5.43E-7 
1.80 1.08E-7 
1.75 2.26E-7 
3.06 6.64E-13 
2.47 2.32E-10 
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CID-SQ CVM 
5.06 .041 
7.04 .035 
7.22 NA 
7.75 NA 
4.88 NA 
2.89 NA 
1.64 NA 
2.39 NA 
1.37 NA 
1.19 NA 
Table III lists the results of applying equations 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.1.5 to the failure 
data for confirmed and unconfirmed removals. The second column in Table III, labeled 
LEFT-TRUN., gives the number of flight hours that the failure data was left-truncated. 
Left-truncation of the failure data (32] removes the effects of infant mortality. An earlier 
study by West [30] concluded that the infant mortality effects for an overhauled IDG had 
the effect of"tlattening" the peril rate for the NHPP model. This effect is evident in Table 
III, the confirmed and unconfirmed peril rates for the case of zero left-truncation results in 
beta being less than one. A beta value of less than one indicates a system showing 
reliability growth; this is not the case for the IDG. As the amount of left-truncation 
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increases from 2000 FH to 5000 FH, the beta value increases. In all cases in Table ill, the 
beta value for the unconfirmed peril rate is less than that of the confirmed peril rate. An 
unconfirmed removal is a result of incorrect field maintenance trouble shooting which is 
not an age dependent process. This has the effect of reducing the rate of increase of the 
peril rate, hence beta, for the unconfirmed peril rate. 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the unconfirmed peril rate with no left-truncation. The 
unconfirmed peril rate is estimated using the natural and NHPP methods. The NHPP 
estimate shows the IDG is experiencing reliability growth while the natural estimate shows 
a "bathtub" [3] shape. The f3 and A parameters are estimated using an iterative approach 
to equations 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.1.5. The program that calculates these parameters is 
THPERIL.M (Appendix D.1) using the data set P40VHUC.DAT (Appendix D.6). The . 
tabular output of program THPERIL.M, for Figures 7 and 8, is given in Appendices D.4 
and D. 5, respectively. 
The only difference between Figures 7 and 8 is in the observation cell, [Ij, Ij+1], 
choice. In Figure 7, the data are divided into five equally spaced observation cells over the 
interval Oto 15,000 FH. In Figure 8, the data are divided into five equally spaced 
observation cells over the interval Oto 13,397 FH. As illustrated in the two figures, the 
difference in the choice of observation cell widths does make a difference in the natural 
estimate of the peril rate. The NHPP estimate is not dependent on the observation cell 
choice and is unchanged between the two figures. 
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Figure 8. Unconfirmed Peril Rate with no Left-Truncation over the Interval O to 
13,397 FH 
Figures 9 and IO illustrate the confirmed peril rate for the IDG failure data. The 
confirmed failure rate is based on actual failures, i.e., C&R or OVH maintenance actions, 
not unconfirmed failures (NFF). The observation cell width is five equally spaced cells 
ranging from Oto 15,000 FH as shown in Figure 9. Figure IO has five equally spaced cells 
ranging from Oto 13,397 FH. Note that both the NHPP and natural estimate of the 
confirmed peril rates are numerically smaller in all observation cells than the confirmed 
peril rates shown in Figures 7 and 8. This is to be expected because the unconfirmed peril 
rate takes into account more maintenance events, i.e., NFF maintenance actions, than the 
confirmed peril rate. 
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The computer program used to analyze the failure data is THPERIL.M (Appendix 
D.l). The data set is P40VHA.DAT is found in Appendix D.9. The output of program 
THPERIL.M for the data set P40VHA.DAT using intervals shown in Figures 9 and IO is 
given in Appendices D.7 and D.8, respectively. 
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The NHPP estimate of the peril rate shown in Figures 7 through 10 indicates the 
IDG is showing reliability growth with the number of flight hours. This contradicts field 
experience and the natural estimate of the peril rate. To bring the NHPP and natural 
estimates of the peril rates into agreement, the failure data are left-truncated. Left-
truncation involves deleting the failure data that fall below a specified value. Table III 
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gives the parameters values for the confirmed and unconfirined peril rates. Note that as the 
amount ofleft-truncation increases, the f3 value increases, and the 1.. value decreases. 
Left-truncation removes the infant mortality effects from the estimate of the peril rate. 
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the effects ofleft-truncation on the unconfirmed peril rate. 
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The computer program used to analyze the failure data is THPERIL.M found in 
AppendixD.l. The 2,000 FH left-truncated data set is P40VH2KU.DAT listed in 
Appendix D.11. The output of program THPERIL.M is found in Appendix D .10. For the 
5,000 FH left-truncated data, the same program is used. The data set is P40VH5KU.DAT 
listed in Appendix D.13. The output· of program THPERIL.M is found in Appendix D.12. 
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Figure 12. Unconfirmed Peril Rate with 5K Left-Truncation over the Interval Oto 
13,397 FH 
3.6 Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
When data are fitted to a parameterized model, for example the power law 
process, it is appropriate to test the compatibility of the model and the data by a statistical 
goodness-of-fit test. Two statistical tests commonly used are the Cramer-Von Mises 
(CVM) and the Chi-squared. Crow [17]adapted a parametric Cramer-Von Mises 
goodness-of-fit test for the multiple system power law process model. This test is 
appropriate whenever both the observation interval start times for each system are zero 
and the failure data are complete over the continuous interval [O, T q] with no gaps in the 
data. The Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test [14,15,17] is a more general test than the 
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Cramer-Von Mises test because the Chi-squared test does not require that the observation 
interval start at zero. 
The 5th and 6th columns of Table III give values for the Chi-squared and Cramer-
Von Mises statistic respectively. Since the CVM test is only applicable for the case where 
the starting time is zero, it is only applied to the data sets with zero left-truncation. At 10 
percent significance level, M=50, the CVM critical value [ 17] is O .173. Since O. 041 and 
0. 03 5 are both less than O .173, then the conclusion is that then NHPP with a power law 
peril rate provides an adequate model for the failure data. An NA in column six of Table 
III indicates the CVM test was not applicable for this data set. 
The Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test is applied to all ten data sets in Table III. 
Column five lists the calculated value of the statistic. At 10% significance level with three 
degrees of freedom, the Chi-squared critical value [14] is 6.25. Not until the left-
truncation reaches 3000 FH does the Chi-squared statistic fall consistently below the 
critical value. This indicates that for the data sets with at least 3000 FH ofleft-truncation, 
the NHPP with power law peril rate provides an adequate model for the failure data. 
3. 7 Effectiveness of the Current Maintenance Program 
In this section the peril rate is investigated to determine the effectiveness of the 
current IDG maintenance program. The current maintenance policy is Type II', i.e., the 
IDG operates until failure and then the IDG is required to be overhauled if it enters the 
repair facility with greater than 14,600 FH. The data in Appendix Bare reduced in a 
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similar manner as in the previous sections of this chapter. For example, the failure time line 
for the first IDG is: 
Trk#l S1=21600, X1 1=23256, X2 1=31646, X3 1=31975, T1=32635. 
' ' ' 
In this case, the focus is on the total time of each drive, 'trrq . An overhaul is assumed to 
not reset the drive flight hours to zero, and the OVH and C&R maintenance actions are 
considered equivalent. The ENG and NFF maintenance actions are ignored. 
The peril rate is estimated using the NHPP MLE technique and the natural 
estimate methods. The data set P4F AIL.M listed in Appendix D .15 is analyzed using 
program THPERIL.M. The output of this program is listed in Appendix D.14. The MLE 
NHPP parameter values are ~ =l. 086 and A =8. lxl 0-5. A beta of approximately one 
indicates a system that is neither improving nor deteriorating with time. Since Si was not 
equal to zero in all cases, the CVM test could not be used. The calculated value of the 
Chi-squared statistic is 3.06; this is well below the 6.25 critical value required for three 
degrees of freedom at the 10% significance level. This indicates that the power law peril 
rate provides a good statistical fit for the failure data. 
The NHPP and natural estimates of the peril rate for the IDG since original 
purchase are shown in Figure 13. Definite conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
current maintenance program cannot be drawn from Figure 13. The natural estimate of the 
peril rate changes over each interval cell with no trend. The beta value of 1.086 indicates 
the IDG has nearly a constant NHPP estimate of the peril rate with time. 
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Figure 13. Peril Rate of IDG Since Original Purchase 
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter it was shown that the IDG failure data peril rate can be 
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parameterized using the NHPP with a power law intensity function. The natural estimate 
method was used to give a non-parameteric representation of the peril rate. Left-
truncation of the failure data is required so that the effects of infant mortality can be 
eliminated and the NHPP model would accurately represent the IDG as a deteriorating 
system. The most common failure modes for the IDG are also quantified in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TYPE II' MAINTENANCE POLICY 
This chapter presents the results of a Monte Carlo simulation that is used to 
minimize the cost per flight hour for an aircraft integrated drive generator. The computer 
model of the operational/maintenance cycle requires seven states to adequately describe 
the system. In the operational state (1), the IDG operates until it is prematurely removed 
due to a reported failure (state 2); or it is removed from the aircraft for an engine change 
(state 7). After a reported failure, the IDG enters the repair facility where three possible 
types of maintenance (states 3-5) can occur. A Type II' maintenance policy requires the 
IDG to be overhauled once a reported failure has occurred and it has accumulated a 
prespecified number of flight hours. Then the IDG remains in inventory (state 6) until it is 
required for service again. 
The Monte Carlo simulation models the IDG's under a Type II' maintenance 
policy. The Type II' policy requires that the IDG be overhauled after a field failure, 
provided it has accrued a predetermined number of flight hours. One parameter that can be 
easily changed is the mandatory overhaul interval (MOI). By varying the MOI when an 
IDG enters the repair facility, the cost per flight hour can be minimized. It is observed that 
when the optimal MOI is chosen, the mean time between failure and the availability are 
also maximized. 
4.1 Description ofMaintenance and Operational Model 
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Figure 14 is a block diagram maintenance model of the IDG. The IDG is in state 
one when it is operational on an aircraft. The peril rate (ROCOF) has been parameterized 
based on the natural estimate method described in Zaino and Berke [12]. As the IDG 
operates on wing, the peril rate changes depending on the number of flight hours [FH] on 
the IDG since an overhaul. After each simulated flight day, the state of the IDG is 
examined to determine if a failure or an engine change has occurred. When a possible 
failure occurs, the model transitions to the reported failure state (state 2). An engine 
change ( state 7) involves removing the aircraft engine which has an IDG attached to it. 
During an engine change the IDG receives no maintenance and is returned to service when 
the engine is placed back on an aircraft. 
State two represents the reported failed state. Possible failures that enter state two 
can either be an unconfirmed or a confirmed failure. An unconfirmed failure occurs when 
the IDG is removed from operation by a field mechanic as a suspected failure. When the 
unconfirmed failure enters the repair facility, it is tested, found to be fully functional, and 
no repair is performed. Confirmed failures require maintenance to be accomplished in the 
repair facility. When an IDG enters the repair facility for maintenance, there are three 
possible maintenance activities that can occur: the IDG is tested and no failure is evident 
(state 5, NFF = No Fault found)~ a minor repair is accomplished (state 4, C&R = Check 
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and Repair); or a complete overhaul (state 3, OVH) is accomplished. When the failed IDG 
has significant damage or it has exceeded the current 14,600 FH mandatory overhaul 
interval, the IDG is overhauled (state 3). If the IDG does not pass the initial visual 
inspection and functional test, it is then disassembled and repaired. If the damage is minor 
and does not require complete disassembly of the unit, then a Check and Repair ( state 4) is 
accomplished. A NFF and C&R repair is considered a "minimal" or "bad-as-old" repair 
[2]. 
The MOI is referred to in the aviation industry as a "soft-time" overhaul; this 
implies that the IDG is only overhauled if it has been removed from an aircraft by a 
reported failure and exceeds the MOI when it enters the repair facility. An operating IDG 
is not removed from an aircraft when it has exceeded the MOI. 
An overhaul resets to zero the number of flight hours on the IDG. Since an 
overhaul replaces or exchanges a significant number of components in the IDG, it is 
treated as a "good-as-new" repair [2]. A "good-as-new" repair resets the peril rate to the 
value before the system goes into initial operation after an overhaul. Since each IDG in 
this study has been overhauled at least once, "good-as-new" refers to the condition just 
after an overhaul, not as purchased from the original equipment manufacturer. 
After the appropriate maintenance has been performed at the repair facility, the 
IDG goes into inventory at one of the field stations. The IDG remains idle in inventory 
until it is needed to replace a failed IDG on an aircraft. 
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Figure 14. Block Diagram of Operational/Maintenance Model 
4.2 State Transition Probabilities and Holding Times 
Because the IDG is primarily a mechanical system, it experiences wear which 
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results in an increasing peril rate with time. As a result of the system's properties changing 
with time, the state transition probabilities are also time dependent. Table IV gives the 
state-to-state transition probabilities. The probabilities are broken down into 3,000 FH 
intervals. The following transitions have probability of one regardless of the interval: 
OVH, C&R and NFF to inventory, inventory to operational, and engine change to 
operational. The transition probabilities are all derived from the field failure and 
59 
operational data contained in Appendix C. The actual time the IDG spends in each state is 
determined by the state holding times. 
TABLE IV 
STATE-TO-STATE TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
CURRENT NEXT FLIGHT TRANSITION 
I\. T B IL 
1 OPERA TTONAL 2 FATUJRE 0-3000 .003915 
1 OPERATIONAL 2FAILURE 3001-6000 .002046 
1 OPERATIONAL 2 FAILURE 6001-9000 .002148 
1 OPERATIONAL 2 FAILURE 9001-12000 .004695 
1 OPERATIONAL 2 FAILURE 12001-15000 .004802 
1 OPERATIONAL 7ENGCHANGE 0-3000 .002001 
1 OPERATIONAL 7ENGCHANGE 3001-6000 .001507 
1 OPERATIONAL 7ENGCHANGE 6001-9000 .001228 
1 OPERATIONAL 7ENGCHANGE 9001-12000 .005217 
1 OPERATIONAL 7ENGCHANGE 12001-15000 .0012 
2FAILURE 30VH 0-3000 .llll 
2FAILURE 30VH 3001-6000 .3684 
2 FAILURE 30VH 6001-9000 .4286 
2FAILURE 30VH 9001-12000 .5 
2FAILURE 30VH 12001-15000 1 
2FAILURE 4C&R 0-3000 .5555 
2 FAILURE 4C&R 3001-6000 .3684 
2FAILURE 4C&R 6001-9000 .4286 
2 FAILURE 4C&R 9001-12000 .3333 
2 FAILURE 4C&R 12001-15000 0 
2FAILURE 5NFF 0-3000 .3333 
2 FAILURE 5NFF 3001-6000 .2632 
2FAILURE 5NFF 6001-9000 .1429 
2FAILURE 5NFF 9001-12000 .1667 
5NFF 12001-15000 0 
From the operational state to the failure state, the transition is the result of taking 
the product of the unconfirmed peril rate and the change in time that was used in the 
simulation. In the model, the change in time (smallest time increment) is one flight day; as 
a result of this, the failure probability is the same as the peril rate. The unconfirmed peril 
rate, or the transition probability from state 1 to sate 2, is not the same as shown in 
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Figure 7. The values obtained in Table IV are obtained by multiplying the peril rate in 
Figure 7 by 11. 3 9 FHIFD. This converts the peril rate from the units of failure/FR to 
failure/FD. 
To accurately determine the optimal maintenance program, the state holding times 
must also be considered. The state holding times are the number of days that the IDG 
spends in each state, i.e.: operational, reported failure, repair facility (states 3-5), 
inventory, and an engine change. In most analytical models, the mean time to repair 
(MTTR) is assumed to be negligible compared to the mean time between failures. In this 
study, the state holding times were parameterized using a Weibull distribution [33]. The 
Weibull density function is given by 
pt 13- 1 [ (t) 13 ] f(t) = e'i3exp - 0 4.2.1 
where Pis the shape parameter and 0 is the scale parameter. The method of Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) was used to determine the shape and scale parameters for 
the state holding times. Dodson [33] reports that MLE is a superior parameter estimation 
technique as compared to probability plotting or hazard plotting. Table V shows the shape 
parameter, scale parameter, and the calculated statistic for each state's holding time. Field 
data is used to determine the Weibull parameters. In the model, the simulated state holding 
times are generated using the Inverse Transform Method [23]. The units for holding times 
are flight days [FD]. One flight day is equivalent to 11.39 FH. 
Note that in Table V the state holding time for the operational state does not have 
any values. As opposed to the other six states, the holding times for the operational state 
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has not been parameterized with a Weibull distribution. In the operational state, the 
probability of failure is dependent upon the number of flight hours since overhaul on the 
IDG. The MATLAB program THSIMEVL.M (Appendix E.6) uses a simulation 
increment of one flight day and tests for a reported failure. Once the reported failure 
condition is satisfied, the loop is terminated, and the program goes to the reported failure 
state (state 2). 
The last column in Table V is the calculated statistic. The software provided with 
reference 33 uses a Hollander-Proschan goodness-of-fit test. Before the Weibull 
distribution can be used to parameterize the state holding times, the calculated Hollander-
Proschan test statistic must fall within the acceptable region of the test. For a significance 
level of 0.05, the acceptable region is+/- 1.96. Since all the calculated statistics in Table V 
fall within this range, it can be concluded that the Weibull distribution with the given shape 
and scale parameters is an adequate model for the state holding times. 
TABLEV 
COSTS AND HOLDING TIMES FOR EACH STATE 
HOLDING HLDTIME HLDTIME CALCULAIBD 
STAIB COST rem TIME fFDl SHAPE PAR. SCALE PAR. STATISTIC 
1 OPERATIONAL 0 151 
- - -
2 FAILURE .615 12.7 .89 12 .549 
30VERHAUL .679 7.4 1 7.4 .307 
4 CHECK & REPAIR .456 7.4 1 7.4 .307 
5NOFAULT .051 7.4 1 7.4 .307 
6INVENTORY .248 49.6 1.23 53 .028 
7 ENCTTNF CHANGE 606 126 12 134 399 
4.2.1 Costs Associated with Each State 
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There are many costs associated with the removal of an IDG from an aircraft, e.g., 
labor, flight delays, flight cancellations, Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items, air 
interruptions, shipping time and cost, repair facility labor and material, and the time spent 
out-of-service in inventory. This section looks at the details associated with each of these 
costs. All costs are per premature removal (PR) and per year. 
Cost of a Premature Removal (CF'FJV 
A premature removal is a reported failure that is not a result of a scheduled 
maintenance program. A premature removal consists of both confirmed and unconfirmed 
failures. The cost of a premature removal, CFFR, breaks down as follows: The first cost is 
the labor, CLRR, to remove the failed IDG and replace it with one from inventory. Since it 
requires four hours for the removal and replacement process, a flight delay or cancellation 
may occur. · The total cost of a premature removal, CFFR, is the sum of the labor cost, 
possible delay and/or cancellation costs. 
Cost of Transit Time (CTFS) 
After the IDG is removed, it must be shipped to the repair facility. This cost is 
made up of the cost of shipping and the cost of the IDG being out-of-service. The out-of-
service cost is a result of the cost of capital, taxes, and storage for the unit while it is not 
operational on the aircraft. The total cost of transit from the aircraft to the repair station is 
the sum of the shipping and out-of-service costs. 
Cost of Air-interrupts (C,41) 
An Air-interrupt (AI) occurs when a critical system fails causing the aircraft to be 
forced into an unscheduled landing. In the best scenario, the aircraft lands at an 
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unscheduled destination where minimal maintenance is performed, and the flight resumes 
with minimal delay to the passengers. In the worst case, the aircraft lands at an 
unscheduled airport, and another aircraft must be ferried in to pick up the passengers so 
they can resume their flight. This can be more costly if the second aircraft is not available 
until the next day, and all of the passengers and crew must be placed in a hotel for the 
night. In any event, the cost of an Air-interrupt is quite high. Since an Air-interrupt does 
not occur on each flight, the cost of an Air-interrupt, CAI, is found by taking the total 
yearly Air-interrupt costs associated with the IDG and dividing by the number of yearly 
premature removals ( same as the number of reported failures). 
Cost of an MEL item (CMEU 
When an IDG fails, it can be immediately replaced, or it can be placarded as 
inoperative and temporarily placed on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). The aircraft is 
allowed to continue revenue flight with one failed IDG. When an IDG is placarded as a 
result of an MEL item, the aircraft is prevented from International routing and can have a 
weight restriction. There is a cost associated with the limited routing capabilities of the 
aircraft and weight restrictions placed on the aircraft. Since an MEL item is not generated 
at each failure, CMEL is the total MEL yearly cost for the fleet divided by the yearly number 
of premature removals (reported failures). 
Cost of a Repair Facility Visit 
A NFF repair (state 5) is the least expensive repair and is represented by CNFF. The 
cost of a C&R (state 4) is represented by CCR. The cost of the most expensive repair, an 
overhaul (state 3), is CoVH, In each of these three states, the cost associated with the 
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repair is a combination of labor, material, and the cost of capital for holding the equipment 
out-of-service. 
Cost of Inventory Time (Cmv) 
After the IDG leaves the repair shop, it is held in inventory until it is required to be 
placed in service. This inventory cost includes the shipping cost to send the IDG back to 
the aircraft and the cost of out-of-service time ('tINVENTORY) while it waits in inventory. 
Cost of an Engine Change (CENG) 
Since in the operational state the IDG is always associated with an aircraft engine, 
the IDG can be taken out-of-service by an engine failure or an engine scheduled 
maintenance. The costs associated with an engine change (CENG) are not resulting from 
maintenance costs; they are the same type of costs as incurred in the inventory state, e.g., 
taxes, interest on capital, storage, etc., and inventory carrying costs. 
Cost of Failure (CF,J 
When an IDG experiences a premature removal (state 2), either a confirmed or 
unconfirmed failure, there is a cost (CFA). The cost of a failure is represented by 
CFA = CFFR + CTFs +CAI+ CMEL· With each failure, there are the field removal (CFFR) and 
transit (CTFs) costs. Since an Air-interrupt or MEL item is not associated with each 
premature removal, this cost is set equal to the average cost per premature removal. 
Summary of Cost per State 
Because the actual dollar costs associated with each state are proprietary 
information, the costs have been expressed in terms of a normalized quantity called a Cost 
Unit [CU]. One Cost Unit is defined as the cost associated with a scheduled removal and 
overhaul and is given by CsR = CLRR + C'IFs + CoHV + Crnv = 1 CU. A scheduled removal 
would occur if the maintenance program requires overhaul after a fixed number of flight 
hours. The costs associated with being in each state are given in Table V. 
4.2.2 Illustrative Realization 
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To better understand how the Monte Carlo simulation works, consider what would 
be a typical simulated course of events for a single IDG. Assume the maintenance history 
is: 395-E, 3480-C, 4951-0. The simulation begins by assuming a freshly overhauled IDG 
is placed on an aircraft. The IDG operates for 395 FH and then is removed from the 
aircraft because of an engine change. The transition from operational to engine change is 
determined by the state-to-state transition probabilities given in Table N. Note that this · 
transition probability is dependent on the total number of flight hours on the IDG. The 
engine change state holding time ( a random variable) is generated using the Weibull 
parameters given in Table V. Assume that the IDG was held out-of-service for 149 FD 
because of the engine change. The cost associated with the engine change is a constant 
0.606CU. 
After the engine change, the IDG returns to the aircraft where it flies for 3480 FH. 
The simulation then transitions from operational to the reported failure state (2). Based on 
the parameters in Table V, the state holding time is 8 FD. The cost associated with the 
reported failure is a constant 0.615 CU. The transition to the next state (NFF, OVH or 
C&R) is based on the state-to-state transition probabilities given in Table IV. In this 
realization of the model, the next state is the Check and Repair state (4). 
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In the Check and Repair state, the IDG is minimally repaired at a cost of 0.456 
CU. The simulated state holding time is 9 FD. After the Check and Repair, the IDG next 
goes in to the Inventory state (6). The simulated state holding time is 35 FD at a cost of 
0.248 CU. After inventory the IDG is returned to the operational state (1). 
In the operational state, the IDG flies for 4951 FH and enters the reported failure 
state (2). This transition is determined as previously described. In state two, the IDG is 
held 13 FD and 0.615 CU is added to the maintenance cost. The next state is the Overhaul 
state (3). Here the IDG is completely disassembled, repaired, inspected, reassembled, and 
tested. The cost of this overhaul is a fixed 0.679 CU. The simulated state holding time is 6 
FD. Since the overhaul completely resets the number of operational hours on the IDG to 
zero, the simulation is terminated at this point. The next IDG is now ready to be 
simulated. 
4.3 Results of Simulation 
The current maintenance program for the IDG is to fly the IDG until failure and 
perform an overhaul at the repair facility when the repair cost exceeds the cost of an 
overhaul or when greater than 14,600 FH have elapsed since the last overhaul. This type 
of mandatory overhaul maintenance policy is not the same as the Type I or II maintenance 
policy discussed in Ascher and Feingold [2]. To optimize the IDG maintenance program, 
the cost per flight hour must be minimized. The cost per flight hour (CU/FH) is given by 
""'k """'N s C . 
CU I FH = L..q=t L..i=t "' 
"k "N8 
.4.,q=l L..i=l 't iq 
4.3.1 
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where k is the total number of IDGs, Ns is the number of states the IDG passes through 
before overhaul, Ciq is the maintenance cost per state of the q-th IDG in the i-th state, 
e.g., CFA, CoHV, CcR, CNFF, CINV, and CENG, and 'tiq is the operation time in each state. Note 
that 'tiq will be zero except in the operational state. 
To minimize the cost per flight hour, 500 IDGs are simulated at each mandatory 
overhaul interval. After each 500 IDG simulations, the random number generator seed is 
changed; this gives 500 different simulations. A total of 1,500 simulations are conducted 
at each MOI. Figure 15 shows the effect on the cost per flight hour of varying the MOI. 
The error bars represent+/- one standard deviation for the three 500 IDG simulations. 
The simulated cost per flight hour (CU/FH) data compares quite well to the field data. The 
field CU/FH is 5.8% lower than the simulated CU/FH at 14,600 MOI. Since this is the 
only field CU/FH available, this is the only MOI where the two could be compared. Figure 
15 also indicates that for an MOI of 12,000 FH or greater, the CU/FH is flat. This implies 
that high MOI results in effectively a "fly-until-failure" policy for the IDG. Above 12,000 
FH MOI the Type II' policy is ineffective. 
The graph in Figure 15 reveals that the cost per flight hour is minimized when the 
MOI or "soft-time" is set at 6,000 FH. By moving the MOI from 14,600 FH to 6,000 FH, 
the CU/FH can be reduced by 6.1 %. The apparent "oscillations" in the CU/FH curve are 
due to the random nature of the Monte Carlo simulation. This effect could be minimized 
by increasing the simulated IDG population. Figure 16 shows the MTBF for the IDG as it 
depends on the MOI. The MTBF reaches a maximum when the MOI is at 6,000 FH. 
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There is an 4.6 % increase in the MTBF when the MOI is decreased from 14,600 FH to 
6,000FH. 
The MTBF for the field data is 15. 9% higher than that of the simulated data. As is 
the case for the CU/FH, the field and model MTBF number can only be compared at an 
MOI of 14,600 FH. 
The goal of this simulation is to minimize the cost per flight hour of the IDG by 
varying the MOI rather than to replicate exactly the current field maintenance costs and 
times. To this end, the simulation is successful. The model is able to predict the relative 
change in the CU/FH and MTBF as it depends on the MOI. The 6.1 % decrease in the 
CU/FH gives the cost justification necessary to change the maintenance program from an 
MOI of 14,600 FH to 6,000 FH. 
)( 10"4 Cost per Flight Hour 
5.--~~-r-~~-.--~~.....-~~-.-~~--.--~~-,---, 
4.9 
4.8 
4.7 
4.6 ,,_J I --I 
I 
lJ.. 
:3 4.5 
(.) 
~t+yl-V// 4.4 
4.3 
4.2 
4.1 
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 
Overhaul Interval [FH] 
Figure 15. Cost per Flight Hour for Simulated Data 
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4 .4 Availability 
In section 2.8 of this Thesis, the availability is defined as: "the probability that the 
system is operating successfully at any point in time under stated conditions." The 
definition of availability is dependent upon the system under study. Throughout this 
Thesis, the word system has meant the IDG. To discuss the availability, the term system 
must now refer to the aircraft- where the IDG is a subsystem. Since an aircraft is not held 
out-of-service while an IDG is being repaired, it is more appropriate to consider the 
effects of the IDG maintenance policy on the availability of the aircraft. 
From section 2.8, the inherent availability is defined as 
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A.= MTBF 
1 MTBF+MTTR 
4.4.1 
Since the IDG is removed from the aircraft for both confirmed and unconfirmed removals, 
the MTBF is replaced by the mean time between unscheduled removal {MTBUR). The 
MTBUR takes into account all reasons for IDG removal except for an engine change. The 
effects of the engine change are not considered since the engine, not the IDG, is the 
primary reason for removal. In equation 4.4.1, the MTTR is now the average IDG 
replacement time rather than the mean time to repair. The average replacement time for 
the IDG is four hours. The inherent availability now becomes 
A.= MTBUR . 
1 MTBUR+4 
4.4.2 
Figure 17 illustrates the dependence of the availability on the MOI of the Type II' 
maintenance policy. To generate Figure 17 the MTBUR from Appendix E.9 is used in 
equation 4.4.2. In Figure 17, the availability peaks when the MOI is 6,000 FH. This result 
is consistent with the minimization of the CU/FH and maximization of the MTBF at 6,000 
FH. 
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Figure 17. Availability as a Function of the Overhaul Interval 
4.5 Simulation Software 
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All of the software written for the Monte Carlo simulation of the IDG operational 
and maintenance cycle is written in MATLAB Student Version 4.0 [34]. There are five 
separate programs that are used in the simulation. The first three programs, 
THMAINTF .M, THEY ALF .M, · and THPERIL.M are used to evaluate the field data so 
that it can be compared with the simulation output. In any simulation, it is necessary where 
possible [35], to validate the simulation output against known data. The last two 
programs, THSIMEVL.M and THSIMDAT.M, perform the Monte Carlo simulation and 
display the results respectively. 
4.5.1 Description of Computer Programs 
This section describes the input, output, and algorithms in each of the five 
programs used in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Program THMAINTF.M (Appendix E.2) has as an input data file 
THMAINTF.DAT ( Appendix E. l). This data file has the number of flight hours from 
each state per IDG for field data. This file is manually produced from the IDG 
maintenance events data set in Appendix C. The output of program THMAINTF.M is 
data file THFIELDF.DAT. This data file contains flight hours, maintenance actions and 
the costs per state. This output file is used as an input for program THEY ALF.M. 
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Program THEY ALF.M (Appendix E.3) loads data file THFEILDF.DAT and 
summarizes the failure data by state and reason for removal. This program calculates the 
state holding times, CU/FH, MTBUR and MTBF. The output is shown in Appendix E.4. 
The last step in the program THEY ALF.Mis to convert the input file to a file format 
readable by program THPERIL.M. This output file is THPERILF.DAT. 
Program THPERIL.M (Appendix D. l) was previously used in Chapter 3 to reduce 
the failure data to determine the NHPP parameters and the natural estimate of the peril 
rate. In this application, data file THPERILF.DAT is the input. A tabular listing of the 
output is shown in Appendix E.5. For the purpose of software validation, it is important to 
notice that the output in Appendix E.5 is identical to the output in Appendix D.8. The 
output shown in Appendix D. 8 is a result of program THPERIL.M with input file 
P40VHA.DAT. Data file P40VHA.DAT (Appendix D.9) contains failure data for 
confumed failures only. The identical outputs in Appendices E.5 and D.8 indicates that 
programs THMAINTF.M and THEV AL.M are written correctly and do not introduce 
errors in the failure data. 
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Program THSIMEVL.M (Appendix E.6) is the Monte Carlo simulation program 
that models the operational and failure states of the IDG. The inputs to the program are: 
state-to-state transition probabilities per 3,000 FH interval cell, random number generator 
seed, cost per state, Weibull parameters used to generate state holding times, MOI, and 
the number of IDG's in the simulation. A listing of the tabular output of program 
THSIMEVL.M is shown in Appendix E. 7. This particular simulation uses an MOI of 
1282 FD which equivalent to 14,600 FH. 
Program THSIMDAT.M (Appendix E.8) combines the outputs, i.e., CU/FH, 
MTBF, and MTBUR, from different runs of program THSIMEVL.M. The tabular output 
of program THSIMDAT.M is listed in Appendix E.9. The graphical output of program 
THSIMDAT.M is shown in Figures 15, 16, and 17. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the results of a Monte Carlo simulation of the IDG 
maintenance and operational cycle. The purpose of the simulation is to minimize the 
maintenance cost per unit flight hour. The Monte Carlo model consists of seven states. 
Each state has a maintenance cost, holding time, and a transition probability to the next 
state. It is shown that the CU/FH minimizes and the MTBUR, MTBF, and availability 
maximize when the mandatory overhaul interval is set at 6,000 FH. 
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CHAPTERV 
TYPE II MAINTENANCE POLICY 
For a repairable system that deteriorates with time, there is an optimal maintenance 
policy that will minimize the maintenance cost for the system. Before an optimal 
maintenance policy can be determined, the failure data must be parameterized in some way 
as to quantify the effects of age on the system. A commonly used [2] approach is to 
represent the failure data with a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) with power 
law intensity function. This method to represent the failure data can be applied to systems 
that deteriorate, show reliability growth, and remain constant with age. Since the NHPP is 
a statistical model for the failure data, goodness-of-fit tests must be used to determine that 
the model is valid for a given statistical significance level. 
By combining an estimate of the parameters used to define the NHPP with 
maintenance cost data, an optimal maintenance policy can be determined. The maintenance 
policy under study is a Type II policy [19]. To use this model, the costs of a minimal 
repair and a scheduled overhaul must be known. 
5 .1 Mathematical Model for a Type II Maintenance Policy 
The Type II maintenance policy was introduced by Barlow and Hunter [19] in 
1960. This policy calls for a planned replacement ( overhaul) of a system after some 
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prespecified number of system operating hours, regardless of the number of intervening 
failures. It is assumed that after each failure, the system is only minimally repaired; 
therefore, the ROCOF is unchanged by the repair. Instantaneous repair is also assumed. 
The Type II policy is the same as a "hard-time" replacement policy commonly used in the 
airline industry. 
Since an overhaul occurs at times T, 2T, 3T, ... , the problem becomes to select T to 
minimize the overall maintenance cost function. The long-run expected cost per unit time 
is given by (20] 
5.1.1 
where E[N(T)] is the expected number of minimal repairs over the interval, and is given by 
E[N (T)] = fo1( u )du. 5.1.2 
CMR is the cost of a minimum repair performed after a failure. This cost does not include 
the cost of an overhaul. CsR is the cost of a scheduled overhaul. Combining the power law 
peril rate given by equations 2.2.1.6, 5.1.1, and 5.1.2, the long-run expected cost per unit 
time becomes 
C(T) = CMR. AT~ + CSR . 
. T 5.1.3 
To minimize C(T), set the derivative of equation 5. 1. I is set equal to zero. The 
resulting equation is 
iT C (p(T)- p(u))du = ~. 
o C MR 
5.1.4 
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This equation has a unique solution provided the peril rate is strictly increasing to oo as 
t ~ oo . When the peril rate is specifically in the form 
p(t) = lf3tll-t ,(3 > I 5.1.5 
then the optimal replacement interval T* becomes 
[ ]
1/ll 
T*- CSR 
l(f3- l)CMR 5.1.6 
Since there is a significant cost associated with a NFF maintenance action, the 
unconfirmed peril, Puc, is used rather than the confirmed peril rate in calculation of the 
optimal replacement interval. The terms overhaul and replacement are considered 
equivalent in this application of the Type II model. 
5.2 Maintenance Costs 
Once the parameters have been determined that characterize the failure data, the 
next step is to determine the costs associated with minimal repair and a scheduled 
overhaul. During a typical operational and maintenance cycle for an IDG under a Type II 
maintenance policy, the IDG first goes through a series of operational periods each 
followed by a minimal repair. After the IDG accumulates a predetermined number of flight 
hours, it is removed from service and overhauled. The overhauled IDG then goes into 
inventory until it is placed back in service on an aircraft. 
The cost of a scheduled removal and overhaul, CsR, is determined by summing the 
following individual costs: 
I. Cost of labor to remove the IDG and replace it with one from inventory. 
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2. Shipping and out-of-service costs. The out-of-service cost is a result of the cost of 
capital, taxes, and storage for the unit while it is not operational. 
3. Cost of an overhaul. This includes the cost of labor and materials. 
4. Cost of inventory. This includes shipping, storage, and out-of-service time. 
Combining these four costs gives the total cost of a scheduled overhaul. Since the actual 
costs are proprietary information, the cost of a scheduled overhaul is defined as one cost 
unit, CSR= 1 CU. 
The computation of the cost of minimal repair, CMR, is more involved than the 
computation of the cost of a scheduled removal. The cost of minimal repair is broken 
down as follows: 
CMR. = P(NFF)(CLRR + CTFS + CNFF) 
+P(C&R)(CFFR +CTFS +CAI +CMEL +CCR)+CINV. 5.2.1 
P(NFF) is the probability that the removal will result in a NFF maintenance action. 
P(C&R) is the probability that the minimal repair will result in a check and repair (C&R) 
maintenance action. The other costs in equation 5.2.1 have been previously defined. A 
C&R maintenance action results from a confirmed IDG failure. A typical C&R 
maintenance action would be the replacement of a leaking output shaft seal. Since this is a 
confirmed failure, there are additional costs incurred relating to possible aircraft flight 
delays and cancellations that this failure may have caused. The final term, CINV, is the cost 
of inventory. The cost of minimal repair written in terms of cost units is CMR=O. 969 CU. 
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5.3 Optimal Replacement Interval 
Now that the peril rate has been determined and the maintenance costs are known, 
the optimal replacement ( overhaul) interval for the Type II maintenance policy can be 
determined. Table VI lists the optimal replacement intervals obtained by substituting the 
unconfirmed peril rates and cost numbers into equation 5 .1. 6. Notice that the optimal 
replacement interval is highly dependent on the amount ofleft-truncation of the data. 
TABLE VI 
REPLACEMENT INTERVALS 
LEFT-TRUNCATION REPLACEMENT 
INTERVAL 
0 UNDEFINED 
2000FH 13966FH 
3000FH 8294FH 
4000FH 7531 FH 
5000FH 6893 FH 
A second approach to determine the optimal replacement interval is to determine 
the long-run expected cost per unit time for the Type II policy (equation 5.1.3). Figure 18 
shows the expected range for the cost function as it depends on the replacement interval. 
The upper curve in Figure 18 is for the 2,000 FH left-truncated data set with both CMR and 
CsR increased by 10 percent. The lower curve is for the 5,000 FH left-truncated data set 
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with both CMR and CsR reduced by 10 percent. The cost parameters are varied so that 
when they are combined with the appropriate data set parameters, the result is the worst 
case for the CU/FH, both high and low. The cost information contained in Figure 18 is 
valuable to Engineering and Production Management because it allows the impact of the 
optimal Type II policy to be quantified. Since aircraft maintenance is done at regularly 
scheduled intervals (e.g., A, B, C checks), this allows the choice of the optimal interval to 
be adjusted to fit in with existing maintenance intervals. 
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5.4 Summary 
To determine the optimal replacement interval for a Type II maintenance policy 
requires the peril rate and the maintenance costs be known. The peril rate was successfully 
modeled using the NHPP with power law intensity function. To remove the effects of 
infant mortality that occur in the IDG after an overhaul, the failure data were left-
truncated. Depending on the amount ofleft-truncation of the failure data, different values 
were obtained for beta and lambda in the NHPP. Combining the NHPP model parameters 
with the maintenance costs for a minimal repair and a scheduled removal gives the optimal 
replacement interval for the Type II maintenance policy. The results of this study indicate 
that the optimal replacement interval is between 7,000 FH and 9,000 FH. As shown in 
Figure 18, there is a broad minimum over CU/FH values between 5,000 FH and 10,000 
FH. This broad minimum gives management the freedom to choose the replacement 
interval at the most convenient and cost effective interval. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
6.1 Summary 
When investigating the failure characteristics of a repairable system, it is necessary 
to know if the system is deteriorating, remaining constant, or improving with time. This 
change in the failure characteristics with time is quantified by the peril rate. The peril rate 
is also called the rate of change of failures (ROCOF). These two terms should not be used 
interchangeably with the hazard rate. The hazard rate is a term that defines the rate of 
failure for non-repairable parts. If the peril rate of a system is increasing with time, the 
system is classified as a deteriorating system. Deteriorating systems are candidates for a 
preventive maintenance program. The system under study in this Thesis is an aircraft 
integrated drive generator (IDG). The IDG provides the primary electrical power to an 
aircraft. 
A commonly used method for quantifying the peril rate is the nonhomogeneous 
Poisson process (NHPP) with a power law intensity function. The NHPP allows a simple 
mathematical model to be used to quantify the peril rate. The peril rate can also be 
quantified non-parametrically by using the natural estimate method for the peril rate. The 
natural estimate takes into account the number of units that fail in a given time interval, 
given that a certain number of units are available to fail. 
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Since infant mortality effects are usually present in repairable systems, the failure 
data may need to be left-truncated to remove these early failures. In the case of the IDG, 
left-truncation is used to remove the failures that occur in less than 5,000 flight hours. 
Left-truncation of the failure data gives NHPP parameters that indicate that the IDG is a 
deteriorating system. This result is consistent with the natural estimate of the peril rate. 
Once the peril rate is accurately parameterized, then the optimal preventive maintenance 
program can be developed for the IDG. 
An optimal preventive maintenance program minimizes the maintenance cost while 
maximizing the MTBF for a system. In the airline industry, there are three types of 
maintenance policies used for components; these are fly-until-failure, Type II and Type 11'. 
The fly-until-failure policy simply requires the unit or system to be replaced at failure. The 
Type II policy, also called a hard-time replacement policy, requires that the unit be 
removed from service once it has reached a specified age. At this point, the unit is routed 
to the repair facility where it is overhauled. An overhaul restores the unit to the fits and 
tolerances called for in the original equipment manufacturer's maintenance manual. The 
Type 11' policy requires that the unit be overhauled once it has reached a given number of 
flight hours, and it has already been removed from the aircraft due to a reported failure. 
The Type II' policy is called a soft time overhaul policy in the airline industry. 
To find the optimal Type II policy, an analytical approach is used. The left-
truncated NHPP parameters are used with an analytical model for a Type II policy. The 
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optimal removal interval is determined to be in the 7,000 to 9,000 flight hour region. An 
exact number of flight hours is not given since the optimal interval is dependent upon the 
values of the NHPP parameters and the costs per maintenance state. Since these quantities 
are not exact, their variability is taken into account. 
The optimal Type II' preventive maintenance policy is found using a Monte Carlo 
simulation. The Monte Carlo simulation is used since an analytical approach based on the 
NHPP has not been developed for this model. The operational and maintenance cycle for 
the IDG is represented by a seven state model. The state transition probabilities and 
holding times are found using field data. The results of the simulation. are that the optimal 
number of flight hours to overhaul for a failed IDG is 6,000. At the optimal mandatory 
overhaul interval (MOI), the MTBF and the availability are maximized, and the cost unit· 
per flight hour is minimized. 
6.2 Areas for Further Work 
The first area of research that requires more work is the development of a Monte 
Carlo simulation for the Type II maintenance policy. This model would allow the Type II, 
Type II', and the fly-until-failure policies to be compared. The fly-until-failure policy can 
be modeled with the Type II' policy simulation by letting the MOI go to a very large 
number. Using the same modeling technique with the same state transition probabilities 
and holding times would allow a direct cost unit per flight hour comparison for the three 
maintenance policies. 
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A second area that would be interesting and useful to pursue would be to see the 
evolution in time of the IDG population when the maintenance policy is changed. By 
having either an analytical or computer model of the IDG population that is time 
dependent, the number of overhauls, availability, MTBF, and CU/FH could be predicated 
on a quarterly basis once the maintenance policy is changed. This would give valuable 
work load and maintenance cost planning information to the responsible management 
areas. It is vital to know the effects of a change in maintenance policy on future repair 
facility personnel and material requirements. 
A third area of investigation would be to develop a NHPP model that has an 
intensity function that can model the entire peril rate for a system. This peril rate function 
would be capable of modeling the infant mortality and wear-out phases of the peril rate. 
The NHPP with power law intensity function has shown to be insufficient when infant 
mortality effects are present. Once the parameters for this model have been determined, a 
preventive maintenance program could be developed based on this formulation of the peril 
rate. This model of the peril rate could also be used to establish product warrantees. 
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APPENDIX A 
IDG MODES OFF All.,URE AND MAINTENANCE 
HOURS HOURS TYPE 
SINCE SINCE LAST OF 
TRK# OVH FAILURE FAILURE MODE MAINT. 
1 10375 329 CARRIER SHAFf ASSY OVH 
2 12737 12737 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
3 5769 5769 PUMP&MOTOR ASSYS: FIXED END OVH 
4 33 33 NFF NFF 
4 4037 4037 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY FIXED END OVH 
4 1306 1273 V ARlABLE END OVH 
5 8289 4178 ROTOR BALANCE ASSY C&R 
6 7981 4970 NFF NFF 
6 6903 3892 NFF NFF 
7 12 12 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE C&R 
8 4077 4146 NFF NFF 
9 3633 851 IOOASSY C&R 
IO 3760 3760 CARRIER SHAFf ASSY C&R 
IO 3849 89 NFF NFF 
11 3419 2309 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
12 1065 1065 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE C&R 
13 9063 1216 MAIN ROTOR OVH 
13 7847 1482 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
14 3271 3271 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY FIXED END C&R 
15 6360 6360 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
16 8721 8721 NFF NFF 
17 9897 9892 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
18 803 803 IOOASSY C&R 
18 10946 10946 MAIN ROTOR OVH 
19 9923 6627 CHARGE PUMP C&R 
20 11995 566 NFF NFF 
20 11429 9147 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
21 9572 9572 CARRIER SHAFf ASSY C&R 
21 9847 275 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY FIXED END OVH 
22 1988 1988 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE MODES C&R 
22 6866 6866 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY FIXED END OVH 
23 8590 8590 CARRIER SHAFf ASSY OVH 
24 9502 9502 NFF NFF 
25 7865 1328 NFF NFF 
26 2680 2680 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY FIXED END OVH 
27 1218 1218 NFF NFF 
27 1223 1223 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
27 6541 6541 V ARlABLE END OVH 
28 10965 5898 NFF NFF 
29 2416 1582 NFF NFF 
29 1070 236 NFF NFF 
30 2011 2011 NFF NFF 
30 6074 6074 VARIABLE END OVH 
31 8680 6661 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE MODES C&R 
32 8333 8333 MAIN ROTOR C&R 
33 4516 4516 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE MODES C&R 
33 6332 1816 NFF NFF 
34 4326 4326 PUMP & MOTOR ASSYS FIXED END OVH 
35 4731 4839 IOOASSY C&R 
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HOURS HOURS TYPE 
SINCE SINCE LAST OF 
TRK# OVH FAILURE FAILURE MODE MAINT. 
35 3902 4010 ROTOR BALANCE ASSY C&R 
36 2406 2406 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
36 1457 -1457 NFF NFF 
36 2303 2301 VARIABLE END OVH 
37 1000 1000 PUMP & MOTOR ASSYS FIXED END OVH 
37 7082 4354 ROTORBALANCEASSY OVH 
38 1587 177 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
39 13234 11459 NFF NFF 
40 8952 8952 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
41 2167 2167 NFF NFF 
42 658 658 NFF NFF 
42 7560 7560 PUMP & MOTOR ASSYS - FIXED END OVH 
43 9446 3819 NFF NFF 
43 12971 7344 PUMP & MOTOR ASSY - FIXED END OVH 
44 6210 6210 VARIABLE END OVH. 
45 2503 2503 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
46 343 343 ELECTRICAL HARNESS C&R 
47 2650 390 NFF NFF 
47 2260 2260 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE MODE C&R 
48 7099 1149 NFF NFF 
48 5950 5950 NFF NFF 
49 11589 11589 ROTORBALANCEASSY C&R 
50 8276 347 ELECTRICAL HARNESS C&R 
50 7929 7929 NON-HARDWARE FAILURE MODES C&R 
51 5470 3425 NFF NFF 
52 8580 7080 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
53 7838 6636 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
54 7 7 STATOR HOUSING ASSY C&R 
55 12778 12778 STATOR HOUSING ASSY OVH 
56 2050 2050 NFF NFF 
57 8424 7428 IDGASSY OVH 
58 2479 2479 ROTORBALANCEASSY C&R 
59 5511 5511 PUMP &MOTOR ASSY:CONTROL UNIT C&R 
60 10164 10164 VARIABLE END OVH 
61 6365 6365 CARRIER SHAFT ASSY OVH 
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APPENDIXB 
IDG MAINTENANCE HISTORY -DATA SET 
TRK INITIAL om 1ST 2ND 3RD 4m sm ,m 1m am FINAL 
# INTVL MAINT INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL ·JNTVL INTVL 
1 21600 0 74-E 138-N 1444-C 2015-E 3966-E 712-E 1697-C 329-0 660 
2 23904 R 2943-0 178-E 9616-0 1830-N 262 
3 23088 0 450-E 2842-E 90-0 4417-R 1352-0 1124-R 467 
4 22104 R 1087-0 2950-0 33-E 344-R 929-0 3126-E 672 
5 R R 2130-N 1981-0 201-E 64-C 980-E 300-E 2433-C 2415-E 3371 
9 R R· 306-R 401-0 2782-N 144-C 7376-0 
12 R R 5685-0 622-N 833-C 4912-0 R 
13 R R 1482-C 854-E 362-0 595-C 2557-E 1948 
14 R R 962-R 277-0 218-E 1654-E 160-C 7265-0 
15 R R 317-E 128-E 817-0 323-N 1956-0 1651-E 1168-C 9317 
16 19320 R 3310-0 372-E 8349-E 1375-C 2956-E 737-0 
17 18496 R 2082-E 2868-0 5-N 418-E 1937-E 2587-0 1024-E 1189-N 706 
18 18712 R 10946-0 803-C 3839-0 729 
19 14768 R 3296-C 2534-0 931-N 2238-E 924-C 2319-0 2096 
20 21016 0 344-C 9147-C 566-N 922-0 1720 
21 17416 R 390-0 126-E 8411-E 645-C 275-0 3793 
22 R R 1494-E 2568-E 2804-0 1988-C 2829-0 R 
23 18592 R 213-E 229-C 902-E 1451-E 4296-0 2403 
24 R R 1029-0 309-N 21-N 101-N 17-C 1413-E 6612-E 1498-0 R 
26 18200 R 2680-0 1031-E 1493-E 1150 
27 14696 0 5897-E 644-0 1218-E 5-C 153-C 1635-0 456 
28 14328 R 1128-R 3936-E 3-C 5898-0 5239 
29 13176 R 834-0 231-N 5-N 0-N 28-N 2416-E 5137 
32 R R 3609-0 2256-E 3698-N 2379-C 142-E 1825-0 R 
33 9144 R 4516-C 1816-E 1048 
34 10232 R 3681-0 2808-E 1515-0 581 
35 12176 R 108-0 3902-C 829-C 7483 
36 11894 R 1838-E 2256-0 1456-N 847-0 2406-0 626 
37 10592 R 28-0 223-N 2477-C 4354-0 1000-0 5365-N 6003 
40 9184 R 1087-E 1524-0 307-C 3607-E 333-C 2094-0 3075 
41 9760 R 3683-E 57-E 345-0 2167-N 2916 
42 10208 R 3075-0 7560-0 658-N 3611 
43 6720 R 2778-0 3668-C 707-E 2793-N 3525-0 3303 
44 7888 R 9590-0 90-N 3849-E 2271-0 2210 
46 R R 4507-E 1839-0 343-C 3322-E 7255 
47 6408 R 828-0 1432-C 35-E 85-E 3-E 26-E 241-N 7996 
48 5296 R 1868-0 5950-N 1149-N 4490-C 2346 
49 6576 R 2643-0 4739-E 4207-C 2212-E 2779 
50 7608 R 1012-0 4818-E 2040-E 1071-C 347-C 4663-0 
51 7096 R 929-C 1116-0 759-C 1466-E 1200-N 4374-C 2888-C 1731 
52 11136 R 5-C 1120-E 3877-0 1822 
53 R R 794-E 326-0 38-C 44-C 2608-E 4028-C 2505-N 3428 
54 4442 R 2095-C 151-0 4808-0 7-C 4662-E 1936 
55 7016 R 4137-E 8641-0 1341-N 76-C 2021-E 507-N 288-E 535 
56 8200 R 5977-0 2050-N 862-C 3964 
57 8464 R 1996-C 6424-0 3258 
58 R R 296-C 119-E 16-E 1067-E 1970-0 2479-C 6321 
59 0 R 1962-E 2922-N 407-N 213-C 1857 
61 0 R 6354-0 205 
62 15504 R 1974-0 1390-C 3173-C 1328-N 1292-E 6055-0 0 
63 6584 R 8860-E 2371-0 11121- 235-E 876-0 0 
N 
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APPENDIXC 
IDG MAINTENANCE EVENTS AFTER OVERHAUL - DATA SET 
TRAK 1 ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 5TH 6TH 7TH 8TH FINAL 
# INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL 
1 74-E 138-N 1444-C 2015-E 3966-E 712-E 1697-C 329-0 
2 178-E 9616-0 
3 450-E 2842-E 90-0 
3 4417-R 1352-0 
4 2950-0 
4 33-E 344-R 929-0 
5 201-E 64-C 980-E 300-E 2433-C 2415-E 3371 
9 2782-N 144-C 7376-0 
12 622-N 833-C 4192-0 
13 595-C 2557-E 1948 
14 218-E 1654-E 160-C 7265-0 
15 323-N 1956-0 
15 1651-E 1168-C 9317 
16 372-E 8349-E 1375-C 2956-E 737-0 
17 5-N 418-E 1937-E 2587-0 
18 803-C 3839-0 
19 931-N 2238-E 924-C 2319-0 
20 344-C 9147-C 566-N 922-0 
21 126-E 8411-E 645-C 275-0 
22 1988-C 2829-0 
24 309-N 21-N 101-N 17-C 1413-E 6612-E 1498-0 
27 1218-E 5-C 153-C 1635-0 
32 2256-E 3698-N 2379-C 142-E 1825-0 
34 2808-E 1515-0 
35 3902-C 829-C 7483 
36 1456-N 847-0 
36 2406-0 
37 223-N 2477-C 4354-0 
37 1000-0 
40 307-C 3607-E 333-C 2094-0 
42 7560-0 
43 - 3668-C 707-E 2793-N 3525-0 
44 90-N 3849-E 2271-0 
46 343-C 3322-E 7255 
47 1432-C 35-E 85-E 3-E 26-E 241-N 7996 
48 5950-N 1149-N 4490-C 2346 
49 4739-E 4207-C 2212-E 2779 
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TRAK 1 ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 5TH 6TH 7TH 8TH FINAL 
# INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL INTVL 
50 4818-E 2040-E 1071-C 347-C 4663-0 
51 759-C 1466-E 1200-N 4374-C 2888-C 1731 
53 38-C 44-C 2608-E 4028-C 2505-N 3428 
54 4808-0 
54 7-C 4662-E 1936 
55 1341-N 76-C 2021-E 507-N 288-E 535 
56 2050-N 862-C 3964 
58 2479-C 6321 
62 1390-C 3173-C 1328-N 1292-E 6055-0 
63 11121- 235-E 876-0 
N 
APPENDIXD 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND DATA SETS FOR 
DATA REDUCTION 
APPENDIX D. l 
LISTING OF MATLAB PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
% file: thperil.m, 12/23/95 
whitebg 
% Parameter estimation of IDG failure data. 
% Data reduction per Crow(l990). 
%************************************************ 
% Variables: 
% k = number of systems 
% nmax = maximum number of intervals in a data row 
% t = stop time for observation of system 
% s = start time for observation of system 
%************************************************ 
clear variables 
date % output date 
%*** Next four lines are changed for each new data set** 
fid=fopen('rmcrowt l .dat' ,'r'); 
load rmcrowtl .dat 
fprintf(' Data file: rmcrowt I. dat\n') 
ydata=rmcrowt I; % transfer from mcperil to ydata 
[k,nmax ]=size(ydata); 
s=ydata(:,l); s=s'; %start of interval 
t=ydata(:,2); t=t'; % end of interval 
%************************************************ 
% Since the data is loaded in a rectangular array 
% there are extra zeros appended to the end of each 
% data row, the zeros must be removed 
94 
o/o************************************************ 
x=zeros{k,nmax-2); 
for kk=l:k, 
nl=O; o/osets the length of data row to zero (initially) 
for nn=3:nmax, 
if ydata(kk,nn)>O, 
x{kk,nn-2)=ydata{kk,nn ); 
nl=nl+l; 
end 
n(kk)=nl; 
end 
end 
beta=l; lamda=l; o/oinitial guesses 
for j=l:20, 
o/olamda first 
ttl=sum(n); 
bbl=sum( (t. /\beta)-( s. /\beta)); 
lamda=ttl/bbl; 
o/o calculate beta 
bbbl=lamda*sum(t.Abeta. *log(t)-s./\beta. *log(s)); 
bbb2=0; 
for kk=l:k, 
for nn=l:max(n), 
if x{kk,nn)>O, 
bbb2=bbb2+log( x{kk,nn) ); 
end 
end 
end 
beta=ttl/(bbb l-bbb2); 
end 
fprintf(' \n') 
fprintf(' MLE of lamda and beta \n') 
lamda,beta 
fprintf(' Minimum Start Time o/og\n',min(s)) 
fprintf(' Maximum Time of last observation o/og\n',max(t)) 
o/o************************************************ 
o/o estimation of the peril rate 
o/o************************************************ 
o/otmax=ISOOO; o/o end of observations 
o/otmin=O; o/o start of observations 
tmax=max(t); 
tmin=min( s ); 
nintvs=S; o/o number of intervals 
tauintv=(tmax-tmin)/nintvs; 
for kk=l :nintvs, 
95 
nfail(kk)=O; nop(kk)=O; 
end 
% count the number of units operative in each interval 
j= I; % interval counter 
for tau=tmin:tauintv:tmax-tauintv, 
tottj(j)=O; % set time per interval timer to zero 
for kk=l:k, 
if s(kk)<=tau+tauintv & t(kk)>tau, 
nop(j)=nop(j)+ I; % count number operative 
% count op time in each intv 
tottj(j)=tottj(j)+(min(t(kk),tau+tauintv)-max(tau,s(kk))); 
end 
end 
j=j+ I; % increment interval counter 
end 
j=l; 
for tau=tmin:tauintv:tmax-tauintv, 
for kk=l:k, % increment unit number 
for nn=l:max(n(kk)), % increment thru failures 
if x(kk,nn)<=tau+tauintv & x(kk,nn)>tau, 
nfail(j)=nfail(j)+ I; 
end 
end 
end 
j=j+l; 
end 
tt=tmin:tauintv:tmax; 
clc 
fprintf(' Time Intervals\n') 
tt 
fprintft' Number that fail in each interval\n') 
nfail 
fprintf(' Number operational in each interval\n') 
nop 
fprintft' Natural estimate of peril rate') 
p=nfail./( tottj) 
fprintf(' NHPP estimate of peril rate') 
clfreset 
axis('square') 
pp(6)=p(5); % transfer peril rate data to new array for plot 
pp(l:S)=p(l:5); 
[ttstrs,pstrs]=stairs(tt,pp); % generates arrays for plots 
pnhpp=beta*lamda*ttstrs."(beta-1); %NHPP peril rate 
plot( ttstrs,pstrs, 'k-', ttstrs(2: length( ttstrs) ),pnhpp(2 :length( ttstrs) ), 'k: ') 
xlabel('Time') 
96 
ylabel('Peril Rate [1/FH]') 
legend('k-', 'Natural Estimate', 'k:','NHPP Estimate') 
print 
pause 
o/o************************************************ 
o/o Goodness of Fit Test using Chi-Square Distribution 
o/o************************************************ 
chi2=0; 
for j=l :nintvs, o/o nintvs is the same as "d" in Crow (1990) 
thetaG)=O; 
for kk=l:k, 
startintv=tmin+G-1 )*tauintv; o/ostart of interval 
endintv=tmin+j *tauintv; o/oend of interval defined by j value 
if s(kk)<=endintv & t(kk)>startintv, 
o/o startintv is the start of observation, s(kk), if it is within 
o/o the interval defined by j 
if s(kk)>=startintv & s(kk)<=endintv; 
startintv=s(kk); 
end 
o/o endintv is the end of observation, t(kk), if it is within 
o/o the interval defined by j 
if t(kk)>=startintv & t(kk)<=endintv, 
endintv=t(kk); 
end 
thetaG)=thetaG)+(lamda *endintv"beta-lamda * startintv"beta); 
end 
end 
chi2=chi2+((nfailG)-theta(j))"2)/theta(j); 
end 
clc 
fprintf(' Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter\n') 
theta,chi2 
o/o************************************************ 
o/o Cramer-von Mises Test 
o/o************************************************ 
if sum( s) < .1, o/o only perform test on data that starts at 0 
o/o step 1 
m=O; 
for kk=l:k, 
ifx(kk,n(kk)) t(kk) o/o failure truncated data 
mq=n(kk)~ 1; 
end 
ifx(kk,n(kk))<t(kk) o/o time truncated 
mq=n(kk); 
end 
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m=m+mq; 
end 
m 
% step 2 
for kk=l:k, 
for nn=l:nmax:-2, 
y(kk,nn)=x(kk,nn)/t(kk); 
end 
end 
% step 3, unbiased estimate of beta 
blnx=O; 
for kk=l:k, 
for nn=l:n(kk), 
blnx=blnx+log( t(kk)/x(kk,nn) ); 
end 
end 
bbeta=(m-1 )/blnx; 
%step 4, first make z array which contains all y's 
knz=O; 
for kk=l:k, 
for nn=l:n(kk), 
knz=knz+l; 
z(knz )=y(kk,nn); 
end 
end 
% now sort z from smallest to largest 
zz=sort(z); 
% step 5, calculate the parametric Cramer-von Mises statistic 
csum=O; 
for j=l:m, 
csum=csum+(zz(j)"bbeta-(2*j-l)/(2*m))"2; 
end 
fprintf(' Cramer von-Mises Test\n') 
c2m=(l/(12 *m))+csum 
bbeta 
end 
%************************************************ 
% Calculation of the instantaneous MTBF 
%************************************************ 
elf 
mtbf=pp."(-1); % MTBF is reciprocal of peril rate 
[ ttstrs,mtbfstrs ]=stairs( tt,mtbf); 
mtbfhhpp=(beta *lamda *ttstrs. "(beta- I)). "(-1 ); 
plot( ttstrs,mtbfstrs, 'k-',ttstrs(2:length( ttstrs) ),mtbfhhpp(2:length( mtbfhhpp) ), 'k: ') 
xlabel('Time') 
98 
ylabel('IMTBF ') 
legend('k-', 'Natural Estimate', 'k: ', 'NHPP Estimate') 
pause 
%print 
APPENDIX D.2 
EXAMPLE OUTPUT FOR PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
The following is the output of program THPERIL.M when the input file was 
RMCROWTl .DAT. The two plots that the program generates are not included. 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
23-Dec-95 
Data file: rmcrowtl.dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
0.4605 
beta= 
0.6153 
Minimum Start Time 1e-010 
Maximum Time of last observation 200 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
0.0000 40.0000 80.0000 120.0000 160.0000 200.0000 
Number that fail in each interval 
99 
nfail = 
14 IO 4 3 5 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
3 3 3 3 3 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
0.1167 0.0833 0.0333 0.0250 0.0417 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
13.3721 7.1128 5.8050 5.0912 4.6187 
chi2= 
2.6531 
m= 
36 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0695 
bbeta= 
0.5982 
100 
101 
APPENDIX D.3 
LISTING OF DATA FILE RMCROWTI.DAT 
The following is a listing of the input data set named RMCROWTI.DAT. This 
data originates from Table 1 on page 389 of reference 17. 
le-10 200 4.3 4.4 10.2 23.5 23.8 26.4 74 77.1 92.1 197.2 0 0 0 0 0 
le-10 200 .15.618.6 19.5 24.2 26.7 45.1 45.8 75.7 79.7 98.6 120.1 161.8 180.6 190.8 
le-10 200 8.4 32.5 44.7 48.4 50.6 73.6 98.7 112.2 129.8 136195.8 0 O O 0 
APPENDIX D.4 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT P40VHUC.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
6-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovhuc.dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
0.0018 
beta= 
0.7928 
Minimum Start Time 1e-010 
Maximum Time oflast observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
0 3000 6000 9000 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
45 19 14 18 4 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
45 40 31 22 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
1.0e-003 * 
12000 
0.3437 0.1796 0.1886 0.4122 0.4215 
15000 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
45.2735 26.7538 16.8111 9.2427 1.9188 
chi2= 
13.2735 
m= 
69 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0350 
102 
bbeta = 
0.5909 
APPENDIX D.5 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.Ml 
WITH INPUT P40VHUC.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
6-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovhuc.dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
0.0018 
beta= 
0.7928 
Minimum Start Time 1e-010 
Maximum Time of last observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt = 
1.0e+004 * 
0.0000 0.2787 0.5575 0.8362 1.1150 1.3937 
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Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
41 20 16 18 5 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
45 41 31 23 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
l.Oe-003 * 
0.3353 0.1975 0.2194 0.3626 0.2779 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
42.8916 25.9978 16.7818 10.6563 3.6724 
chi2= 
7.0443 
m= 
69 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0350 
bbeta = 
0.5909 
104 
APPENDIX D.6 
LISTING OF DATA FILE P40VHUC.DAT 
This data set contains all unconfirmed failures with no truncation of the data . 
. lE-10 10375 212 1656 10046 10375 0 O 
lE-10 9794 9794 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 3382 3382 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 2950 2950 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 9764 265 3978 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 10302 2782 2926 10302 0 0 0 
IE-10 6367 622 1455 6367 0 0 0 
lE-10 5100 595 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 9297 2032 9297 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 2279 323 2279 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 12136 2819 0 0 0 0 O 
IE-10 13789 10096 13789 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4947 5 4947 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4642 803 4642 0 00 0 
IE-10 6412 913 4093 6412 0 0 0 
IE-10 10979 344 9491 10057 10979 0 0 
lE-10 9457 9182 9457 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4817 1988 4817 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 9971309330 431 448 9971 0 
IE-10 3011 1223 1376 3011 0 0 O 
IE-10 10300 5954 8333 10300 0 0 0 
IE-10 4323 4323 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 12214 3902 4731 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 2303 1456 2303 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 2406 2406 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 7054 223 2700 7054 0 0 0 
IE-10 1000 1000 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 6341 307 4247 6341 0 0 0 
lE-10 7560 7560 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 10693 3668 7168 10693 0 0 0 
IE-10 6210 90 6210 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 10920 343 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 9818 1432 1822 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 13935 5950 7099 11589 0 0 0 
IE-10 13937 8946 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 12939 7929 8276 12939 0 0 0 
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lE-10 12418 759 3425 7799 10687 0 0 
lE-10 12651 38 82 6718 9223 0 0 
lE-10 4808 4808 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 6605 7 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 4768 1341 1417 3945 0 0 0 
lE-10 6876 2050 2912 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 8800 2479 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 13238 1390 4563 5891 13238 0 0 
lE-10 12232 11121 12232 0 0 0 0 
APPENDIX D.7 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT P40VHA.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
6-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovha.dat 
l\1LE oflamda and beta 
lamda= 
3. 7760e-004 
beta= 
0.9335 
Minimum Start Time 1e-010 
Maximum Time of last observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
0 3000 6000 9000 12000 15000 
106 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
30 14 12 15 4 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
45 40 31 22 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
1.0e-003 * 
0.2291 0.1323 0.1617 0.3435 0.4215 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
29.0648 21.3588 14.4654 8.3278 1.7833 
chi2= 
11.0870 
m= 
44 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0413 
bbeta= 
107 
0.6217 
APPENDIXD.8 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT P40VHA.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
6-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovha. dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
3.7760e-004 
beta= 
0.9335 
Minimum Start Time 1e-010 
Maximum Time oflast observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt = 
l.Oe+004 * 
0.0000 0.2787 0.5575 0.8362 1.1150 1.3937 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
26 18 11 15 5 
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Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
45 41 31 23 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
1.0e-003 * 
0.2126 0.1777 . 0.1508 0.3022 0.2779 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
27.2674 20.5457 14.2865 9.5089 3.3915 
chi2= 
5.0643 
m= 
44 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0413 
bbeta= 
0.6217 
109 
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APPENDIX D.9 
LISTING OF DATA FILE P40VHA.DAT 
This data set contains confirmed failures only. NFF failures are not included in this 
data set. 
IE-IO 10375 1656 10046 10375 0 0 0 
IE-10 9794 9794 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 3382 3382 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 2950 2950 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 9764 265 3978 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 10302 2926 10302 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 63671455 6367 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 5100 595 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 9297 2032 9297 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 2279 2279 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 12136 2819 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 13789 10096 13789 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 4947 4947 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4642 803 4642 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 6412 4093 6412 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 10979 344 9491 10979 0 0 0 
IE-IO 9457 9182 9457 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 4817 1988 4817 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 9971 448 9971 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 3011 1223 1376 301100 0 
IE-10 10300 8333 10300 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4323 4323 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 12214 3902 473100 0 0 
IE-10 2303 2303 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 2406 2406 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 7054 2700 7054 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 1000 1000 0 0 0 0 0 
lE-10 6341 307 4247 6341 0 0 0 
IE-IO 7560 7560 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 10693 3668 10693 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 6210 6210 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 10920 343 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 9818 1432 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 13935 11589 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-IO 13937 8946 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 12939 7929 8276 12939 0 0 0 
IE-10 12418 759 7799 10687 0 0 0 
IE-10 12651 38 82 6718 0 0 0 
IE-10 4808 4808 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 6605 7 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 4768 1417 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 6876 2912 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 8800 2479 0 0 0 0 0 
IE-10 13238 1390 4563 13238 0 0 0 
IE-10 12232 12232 0 0 0 0 0 
APPENDIXD.10 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT P40VH2KU.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
7-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovh2ku.dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
2.0783e-005 
beta= 
1.2679 
Minimum Start Time 2000 
Maximum Time oflast observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
Ill 
1.0e+004 * 
0.2000 0.4387 0.6775 0.9162 1.1550 1.3937 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
22 14 9 17 5 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
40 33 24 20 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
1.0e-003 * 
0.2575 0.2086 0.1767 0.5123 0.3573 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
19.4013 17.7684 14.8716 10.3608 4.6078 
chi2= 
7.7534 
APPENDIX D.11 
LISTING OF DATA FILE P40VH2KU.DAT 
2000 10375 10046 10375 0 0 0 0 
2000 9794 9794 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 3382 3382 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 2950 2950 0 0 0 0 0 
112 
2000 9764 3978 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 10302 2782 2926 10302 0 0 0 
2000 6367 6367 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 9297 2032 9297 0 0 0 0 
2000 2279 2279 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 12136 2819 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 13789 10096 13789 0 0 0 0 
2000 4947 4947 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 4642 4642 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 6412 4093 6412 0 0 0 0 
2000 10979 9491 10057 10979 0 0 0 
2000 9457 9182 9457 0 0 0 0 
2000 4817 4817 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 9971 9971 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 3011 3011 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 10300 5954 8333 10300 0 0 0 
2000 4323 4323 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 12214 3902 473100 0 0 
2000 2303 2303 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 2406 2406 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 7054 2700 7054 0 0 0 0 
2000 6341 4247 6341 0 0 0 0 
2000 7560 7560 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 10693 3668 7168 10693 0 0 0 
2000 6210 6210 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 13935 5950 7099 11589 0 0 0 
2000 13937 8946 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 12939 7929 8276 12939 0 0 0 
2000 12418 3425 7799 10687 0 0 0 
2000 12651 6718 9223 0 0 0 0 
2000 4808 4808 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 4768 3945 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 6876 2050 2912 0 0 0 0 
2000 8800 2479 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 13238 4563 5891 13238 0 0 0 
2000 12232 11121 12232 0 0 0 0 
APPENDIXD.12 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT DATA P40VH5KU.DAT 
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EDU» thperil 
ans= 
8-Feb-96 
Data file: p4ovh5ku.dat 
MLE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
2.3200e-010 
beta= 
2.4656 
Minimum Start Time 5000 
Maximum Time oflast observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt = 
1.0e+004 * 
0.5000 0.6787 0.8575 1.0362 l.2150 1.3937 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
8 8 13 6 4 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
23 19 17 11 8 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
114 
l.Oe-003 * 
0.2036 0.2546 0.4756 0.3932 0.5036 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
7.5084 8.8808 10.4384 7.5316 4.7866 
chi2= 
1.1889 
APPENDIX D.13 
LISTING OF DATA FILE P40VH5KU.DAT 
5000 10375 10046 10375 0 0 0 0 
5000 9794 9794 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 10302 10302 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 6367 6367 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 9297 9297 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 13789 10096 13789 0 0 0 0 
5000 6412 6412 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 10979 9491 10057 10979 0 0 0 
5000 9457 9182 9457 0 0 0 0 
5000 9971 9971 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 10300 5954 8333 10300 0 0 0 
5000 7054 7054 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 6341 6341 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 7560 7560 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 10693 7168 10693 0 0 0 0 
5000 6210 6210 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 13935 5950 7099 11589 0 0 0 
5000 13937 8946 0 0 0 0 0 
5000 12939 7929 8276 12939 0 0 0 
5000 12418 7799 10687 0 0 0 0 
5000 12651 6718 9223 0 0 0 0 
5000 13238 5891 13238 0 0 0 0 
5000 12232 11121 12232 0 0 0 0 
115 
APPENDIXD.14 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERil,.M 
WITH DATA FILE P4F AIL.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
16-Jan-96 
Data file: p4fail.dat 
l\1LE of lamda and beta 
lamda= 
8.1083e-005 
beta= 
1.0857 
Minimum Start Time I e-0 IO 
Maximum Time oflast observation 36419 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
l.Oe+004 * 
0.0000 0.7284 1.4568 2.1851 2.9135 3.6419 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
6 23 34 18 II 
116 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
9 23 32 21 11 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
l.Oe-003 * 
0.2820 0.1990 0.2033 0.1648 0.2751 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Parameter 
theta= 
3.7812 22.6576 34.1162 22.9214 8.5578 
chi2= 
3.0612 
EDU» 
APPENDIXD.15 
LISTINGOFDATAFILE P4FAIL.DAT 
21600 32635 23256 31646 31975 0 0 0 
23904 35790 33698 0 0 0 0 0 
23088 33830 26470 32239 0 0 0 0 
22104 31245 2319126141274470 0 0 
19320 36419 22630 32726 36419 0 0 0 
18496 31312 23446 28393 0 0 0 0 
18712 35029 29658 30461 34300 0 0 0 
14768 29106 18064 20598 24691 27010 0 0 
21016 33715 21360 30507 31995 0 0 0 
17416 31056 17806 26988 27263 0 0 0 
18592 28086 19034 25683 0 0 0 0 
18200 24554 20880 0 0 0 0 0 
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14696 24704 14696 21237 22460 22613 24248 0 
14328 29404 18267 24165 0 0 0 0 
13176 21827 14010 0 0 0 0 0 
9144 16524 13660 0 0 0 0 0 
10232 18817 13913 18236 0 0 0 0 
12176 24498 12284 16186 17015 0 0 0 
11894 21413 16078 18381 20787 0 0 0 
10592 30042 10620 13320 17674 18674 0 0 
9184 21211 11795 12102 16042 18136 0 0 
9760 18928 13845 0 0 0 0 0 
10208 25112 13283 20843 0 0 0 0 
6720 23494 9498 13166 20191 0 0 0 
7888 25898 17478 23688 0 0 0 0 
6408 17054 7236 8668 0 0 0 0 
5296 21099 7164 18753 0 0 0 0 
6576 23156 9219 18165 0 0 0 0 
7608 21559 8620 16549 16896 21559 0 0 
7096 21559 8025 9141 9900 16940 19828 0 
11136 17960 11141 16138 0 0 0 0 
4442 18101 6537 6688 11496 11503 0 0 
7016 22578 19794 21211 0 0 0 0 
8200 21053 14177 17089 0 0 0 0 
8464 20142 10460 16884 0 0 0 0 
le-10 7361 5504 O O O O O 
le-10 6559 6354 0 0 0 0 0 
15504 30716 17478 18868 22041307160 0 
6584 30047 17815 30047 0 0 0 0 
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1 74 7 
1 138 5 
1 1444 4 
1 2015 7 
1 3966 7 
1 712 7 
1 1697 4 
1 329 3 
2 178 7 
2 9616 3 
3 450 7 
3 2842 7 
3 90 3 
4 2950 3 
5 201 7 
5 64 4 
5 980 7 
5 300 7 
5 2433 4 
5 2415 7 
5 3371 1 
6 2782 5 
6 144 4 
6 7376 3 
7 622 5 
7 833 4 
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APPENDIXE 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND DATA 
SETS FOR MAINTENANCE POLICIES 
APPENDIX E.1 
LISTING OF DATA FILE THMAINTF.DAT 
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7 4912 3 
8 595 4 
8 2557 7 
8 1948 1 
9 218 7 
9 1654 7 
9 160 4 
9 7265 3 
10 323 5 
10 1956 3 
11 1651 7 
11 1168 4 
11 9317 1 
12 372 7 
12 8349 7 
12 1375 4 
12 2956 7 
12 737 3 
13 5 5 
13 418 7 
13 1937 7 
13 2587 3 
14 803 4 
14 3839 3 
15 931 5 
15 2238 7 
15 924 4 
15 2319 3 
16 344 4 
16 9147 4 
16 566 5 
16 922 3 
17 126 7 
17 8411 7 
17 645 4 
17 275 3 
18 1988 4 
18 2829 3 
19 309 5 
19 21 5 
19 101 5 
19 17 4 
19 1413 7 
19 6612 7 
19 1498 3 
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20 1218 7 
20 5 4 
20 153 4 
20 1635 3 
21 2256 7 
21 3698 5 
21 2379 4 
21 142 7 
21 1825 3 
22 2808 7 
22 1515 3 
23 3902 4 
23 829 4 
23 7483 1 
24 1456 5 
24 847 3 
25 2406 3 
26 223 5 
26 2477 4 
26 4354 3 
27 1000 3 
28 307 4 
28 3607 7 
28 333 4 
28 2094 3 
29 7560 3 
30 3668 4 
30 707 7 
30 2793 5 
30 3525 3 
31 90 5 
31 3849 7 
31 2271 3 
32 343 4 
32 3322 7 
32 7255 1 
33 1432 4 
33 35 7 
33 85 7 
33 3 7 
33 26 7 
33 241 5 
33 7996 1 
34 5950 5 
34 1149 5 
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34 4490 4 
34 2346 1 
35 4739 7 
35 4207 4 
35 2212 7 
35 2779 1 
36 4818 7 
36 2040 7 
36 1071 4 
36 347 4 
36 4663 3 
37 759 4 
37 1466 7 
37 1200 5 
37 4374 4 
37 2888 4 
37 1731 1 
38 38 4 
38 44 4 
38 2608 7 
38 4028 4 
38 2505 5 
38 3428 1 
39 4808 3 
40 7 4 
40 4662 7 
40 1936 1 
41 1341 5 
41 76 4 
41 2021 7 
41 507 5 
41 288 7 
41 535 1 
42 2050 5 
42 862 4 
42 3964 1 
43 2479 4 
43 6321 1 
44 1390 4 
44 3173 4 
44 1328 5 
44 1292 7 
44 6055 3 
45 11121 5 
45 235 7 
45 876 3 
APPENDIX E.2 
LISTING OF PROGRAM THMAINTF.M 
%thmaintf m, 2/3/96 
% Program converts field IDG failure data to a format 
% ready for use by program theval.m 
% tsov Time since overhaul, reset with each overhaul [days] 
% teal Calendar time, an overhaul does not reset [days] 
% all time is in days, I day= 11.39 FH 
cfa=.6146; % cost of a field failure in cost units [CU] 
covh=.679; % cost ofan IDG overhaul [CU] 
ccr=.456; % cost of a Check and Repair [CU] 
cnff=.051; % cost ofa No Fault Found [CU] 
cinv=.248; % cost of time in inventory [CU] 
ceng=.6065; % cost ofan engine change [CU] 
copr=O; % cost of operational state 
tfail=l2. 7; % number of days in failure state 
trepair=7.4; % number of days in repair facility 
tinv=49.6; % number of days in inventory 
teng=l26; % number of days in engine change 
% input field data file 
fid=fopen('thmaintf dat', 'r'); 
load thmaintf. dat 
mcmaint=thmaintf 
cprint=O; 
[nrows ncols]=size(mcmaint) 
for k=l:nrows, 
trk=mcmaint(k, I); % tracking number 
timefh=mcmaint(k,2); % flight hours in operational state 
state=mcmaint(k,3); % state unit is in 
if state I % operational state ** * ** ** * * ** ** * * 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
tcal=timefh/11.39; 
tsov=timefh/11.39; 
mcfield(cprint,I:S)=[trk I tsov teal copr]; 
elseif state 3 % overhaul state ** ** * ** ** * * ** * 
% operational state 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
tcal=timefh/11.39; % increment calendar time [days] 
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tsov=timefh/11.39; % increment tsov [days] 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 1 tsov teal copr]; 
% failure state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=tfail; 
tsov=O; 
mcfield( cprint, 1: 5)=[ trk 2 tsov teal cfa ]; 
% overhaul 
tcal=trepair; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 3 0 teal covh]; 
% inventory state 
tcal=tinv; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 6 0 teal cinv]; 
elseif state 4 · % C&R state********************* 
% operational state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=timefh/11.39; % increment calendar time [days] 
tsov=timefh/11.39; % increment tsov [days] 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 1 tsovtcal copr]; 
% failure state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=tfail; 
tsov=O; 
mcfield( cprint, 1: 5)=[ trk 2 tsov teal cfa ]; 
%C&Rstate 
tcal=trepair; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 4 0 teal ccr]; 
% inventory state 
tcal=tinv; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield(cprint,l:5)=[trk 6 0 teal cinv]; 
elseif state 5 % NFF state******************* 
% operational state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=timefh/11.39; % increment calendar time [days] 
tsov=timefh/11.39; % increment tsov [days] 
mcfield(cprint,1:5)=[trk 1 tsov teal copr]; 
% failure state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=tfail; 
tsov=O; 
mcfield( cprint, 1: 5)=[ trk 2 tsov teal cfa ]; 
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% NFF state 
tcal=trepair; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield( cprint, 1: 5)=[ trk 5 0 teal cnfl]; 
% inventory state 
tcal=tinv; 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcfield(cprint,1:5)=[trk 6 0 teal cinv]; 
elseif state 7 % engine change * * * * ** * ** ** ** ** * * ** 
% operational state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=timefh/1 L39; % increment calendar time [days] 
tsov=timefh/11.39; % increment tsov [days] 
mcfield( cprint, 1: 5)=[ trk 1 tsov teal copr ]; 
% engine change state 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
tcal=teng; 
tsov=O; 
mcfield(cprint,1:5)=[trk 7 tsov teal ceng]; 
end 
end 
mcfield 
% output data file to disk 
fid=fopen('thfieldf dat', 'w') 
save 'thfieldf dat' mcfield -ascii 
status=fclose(fid); 
APPENDIXE.3 
LISTING OF PROGRAM THEV ALF.M 
% thevalfm, 2/3/96 
% This program takes the data generated by program 
% thmaintfm and calculates statistics 
load thfieldfdat 
dat=thfieldf; 
[ nrows,ncols ]=size( dat ); % determine size of data file 
% take data from dat and puts in individual arrays 
trk=dat(:,1); % tracking number from column 1 
state=dat(:,2); % state from column 2 
dtsov=dat(:,3); % incremental change in time since ovh- col 3 
dtcal=dat(:,4); % incremental change in calendar time - col 4 
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cost=dat(:,S); % cost of state - column 5 
s=date 
% Determine the percent ofNFF, C&R, and OVH failures 
novh=O;nnff.=O;nccr=O;neng=O; 
for j= 1: length( state) 
if state(j)=3 % number of overhauls 
novh=novh+ 1; 
elseif state(j)=4 % number of C&R 
nccr=nccr+ 1; 
elseif state(j)=S % number of NFF 
nnff=nnff+ 1; 
elseif state(j)=7 % number. of eng changes 
neng=neng+ 1; 
end 
end 
nfails=novh+nccr+nnff; % total number of failures 
clc 
fprintf(' Summary - Types of Repairs\n') 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf(' STATE # EVENTS PERCENT\n') 
fprintf(' ----- -------- -------\n') 
fprintf(' OVH %d %3. lf\n',novh,(novh/nfails)*lOO) 
fprintf(' C&R %d %3. lf\n',nccr,(nccr/nfails)*lOO) 
fprintf(' NFF %d %3. lf\n',nnff,(nnff7nfails)*100) 
% Determine percent types of removals, ie, eng chg or failure 
pengchg=( neng/( neng+nfails) )* 100; % percent eng changes 
pfails=(nfails/( neng+nfails)) * 100; % percent failures 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf(' Summary - Types ofRemovals\n') 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf(' REASON FOR\n') 
fprintf(' REMOVAL # EVENTS PERCENT\n') 
fprintf(' ------- -------- -------\n') 
fprintf(' ENG CHG %d %3. lf\n',neng,pengchg) 
fprintf(' FAILURE %d %3. lf\n',nfails,pfails) 
% Average times in each state 
nopr=O; nfail=O; novh=O; nccr=O; nnff.=O; ninv=O; neng=O; 
for j= 1:length( state) 
if state(j)= 1 % operation 
topr(nopr+ 1 )=dtcal(j); % transfers cal time data to array 
nopr=nopr+ 1; % increment op state counter 
elseif state(j)=2 % failure state 
tfail(nfail+l)=dtcal(j); % transfers cal times to array 
nfail=nfail+ 1; % counts the # of times in failure state 
elseif state(j)=3 % overhaul 
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tovh(novh+ I )=dtcal(j); 
novh=novh+ I; 
elseif state(j) 4 % C&R 
tccr(nccr+ I )=dtcal(j); 
nccr=nccr+ I; 
elseif state(j)=S % NFF 
tnfftnnff+ I )=dtcalG); 
nnff=nnff+-1; 
elseif state(j)=6 % inventory 
tinv(ninv+ I )=dtcal(j); 
ninv=ninv+ I; % sums number of visits to inventory . 
elseif state(j)=7 % engine change 
teng(neng+ I )=dtcal(j); 
neng=neng+ I; 
end 
end 
% calculate and display averages for each state 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintft' Holding Times for each State\n') 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' STATE AVERAGE[DAYS] VARIANCE[DAYS]\n') 
fprintft'------ ------------- ------------- \n') 
fprintft' OPERATION %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(topr),std(topr)"2) 
fprintft' FAILURE %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tfail),std(tfail)"2) 
fprintft' OVERHAUL %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tovh),std(tovh)"2) 
fprintf(' C&R %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tccr),std(tccr)"2) 
fprintf(' NFF %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tnfl),std(tnfl)"2) 
fprintf(' INVENTORY %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tinv),std(tinv)"2) 
fprintft' ENG CHG %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(teng),std(teng)"2) 
% Cost per flight hours 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf(' Cost per flight hour= %g [CU/FH]\n',sum(cost)/(sum(topr)*l l.39)) 
% Calculation of MTBUR - Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals 
% An unscheduled removal is for failure only 
% MTBUR = (total flight hours)/(total failures) 
mtbur=(sum(topr)*l 1.39)/nfail; 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' MTBUR= %g [FH]\n',mtbur) 
% MTBF=(total flight hours)/(total confirmed failures) 
mtbf=(sum(topr)* 11.39)/(novh+nccr); 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintft' MTBF = %g [FH]\n',mtbf) 
% Number of units total 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintf(' Number of units= %g\n' ,max( trk)) 
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o/o************************************************** 
o/o This section converts the data into a format so 
o/o it can be read by program mcperilfm. This program 
o/o calculates the peril rate. 
o/o************************************************** 
o/o Calculate the cumulative time since OVH (cumtsov) 
cumtsov=zeros( max( trk ), 6); 
for ltrk=l:max(trk) o/o loop thru each trk# 
ntrk=O; o/o counts numer of times for each trk # 
nfail=O; o/o counts number of failures per trk # 
tsf=O; o/o time since failure 
for ldat=l:length(state) o/o loop thru each row 
if trk(ldat )=ltrk 
ntrk=ntrk+ 1; 
onetrk( ntrk, 1 : 3 )=[ltrk state(ldat) dtsov(ldat)]; 
end 
end 
o/o extract failures from onetrk() and write to cumtsov() 
o/o array onetrk(,) contains: 
o/o rowl =tracking#, row2 = state, row3 = operational time 
for lonet=l :ntrk 
o/o keep adding operational times until C&R or OVH 
tsf=tsf+onetrk(lonet,3 ); 
if ((onetrk(lonet,2)=3)l(onetrk(lonet,2)-4)) 
o/o stop adding operation time at OVH or C&R 
nfail=nfail+ 1; 
cumtsov(ltrk,nfail)=tsf; 
tsf=O; o/o reset time since failure 
end 
end 
lastint(ltrk)=O; o/o array contains final oper. intvr 
if onetrk(ntrk,2)=1 o/o final event is operation state 
lastint(ltrk)=tsf* 11.39; 
end 
cumtsov(ltrk, 1 :nfail)=cumsum( cumtsov(ltrk, 1 :nfail) ); 
end 
o/o Write data to output file for program mcperil.m 
fid=fopen('mcperil. dat', 'w') 
cprint=O; 
o/o convert cumtsvo() from flight days to flight hours 
cumtsov(:,: )=l l .39*cumtsov(:,: ); 
for ltrk=l:max(trk) 
o/o count the number of nonzero entries in cumtsov() 
lnonz=O; 
for j=l:6 
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if cumtsov(ltrkj)>O 
lnonz=lnonz+ I; 
end 
end 
% output format depends on # of nonzero numbers in cumtsov() 
iflnonz=l 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I :8)=[le-l O,cumtsov(ltrk, I )+lastint(ltrk),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),0,0,0,0,0]; 
elseif lnonz=2 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I: 8)=[ I e-
10,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, l ),cumtsov(ltrk,2), 0, 0, 0, 0]; 
elseif lnonz=3 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I: 8)=[ I e-
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10,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, l ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),0, 0, 
O]; 
elseif lnonz 4 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I: 8)=[ I e-
l O,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),cum 
tsov(ltrk,4),0,0]; 
elseif lnonz 5 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I: 8)=[ I e-
l 0,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),cum 
tsov(ltrk,4),cumtsov(ltrk,5),0]; 
elseif lnonz=6 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I: 8)=[ I e-
l O,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),cum 
tsov(ltrk,4),cumtsov(ltrk,5),cumtsov(ltrk,6)]; 
end 
end 
% write output file 
fprintf('\n') 
fprintf(' Output data file (thperilfdat)\n') 
mcperil 
fid=fopen('thperilf dat', 'w'); 
save 'thperilf dat' mcperil -ascii 
status=fclose(fid); 
APPENDIX E.4 
OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THEV ALF.M 
WITH INPUT DATA FILE THFIELDF.DAT 
EDU» THEV ALF 
s= 
23-Feb-96 
Summary - Types of Repairs 
STATE # EVENTS PERCENT 
OVH 
C&R 
NFF 
31 
44 
25 
31.0 
44.0 
25.0 
Summary - Types of Removals 
REASON FOR 
REMOVAL # EVENTS PERCENT 
ENG CHG 
FAILURE 
48 
100 
32.4 
67.6 
Holding Times for each State 
STATE AVERAGE[DAYS] VARIANCE[DAYS] 
OPERATION 
FAILURE 
OVERHAUL 
C&R 
NFF 
INVENTORY 
ENG CHG 
197.3 
12.7 
7.4 
7.4 
7.4 
49.6 
126.0 
41738.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Cost per flight hour= 0.000433264 [CU/FH] 
MTBUR= 3641.2 [FH] 
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MTBF = 4854.93 [FH] 
Number of units= 45 
fid= 
3 
Output data file (thperilfdat) 
APPENDIX E.5 
TABULAR OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THPERIL.M 
WITH INPUT FILE THPERILF.DAT 
EDU» thperil 
ans= 
23-Feb-96 
Data file: thperilfdat 
MLE oflamda and beta 
lamda= 
3. 77 60e-004 
beta= 
0.9335 
Minimum Start Time le-010 
Maximum Time oflast observation 13937 
Time Intervals 
tt= 
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1.0e+004 * 
0.0000 0.2787 0.5575 0.8362 1.1150 1.3937 
Number that fail in each interval 
nfail = 
26 18 11 15 5 
Number operational in each interval 
nop= 
45 41 31 23 10 
Natural estimate of peril rate 
p= 
l.Oe-003 * 
0.2126 0.1777 0.1508 0.3022 0.2779 
NHPP estimate of peril rate Chi-Square Goodness ofFit Parameter 
theta= 
27.2674 20.5457 14.2865 9.5089 3.3915 
chi2= 
5.0643 
m= 
44 
Cramer von-Mises Test 
c2m= 
0.0413 
132 
bbeta = 
0.6217 
APPENDIXE.6 
LISTING OF PROGRAM THSIMEVL.M 
%thsimevl.m, 2/13/96 
% Program to Monte Carlo model 
% the operational/maintenance cycle of the IDG 
% Definitions of variables 
% tsov Time since overhaui reset with each overhaul [days] 
% teal Calendar time, an overhaul does not reset [days] 
% all time is in days, 1 day= 11.39 FH 
c=fix(clock) % date and time 
%nseed=l; % random number generator seed 
rand('seed',nseed) % seed number for the random generator 
cfa=.6146; % cost of a field failure in cost units [CU] 
covh=.679; % cost ofan IDG overhaul [CU] 
ccr=.456; % cost of a Check and Repair [CU] 
cnff=. 051; % cost of a No Fault Found [CU] 
cinv=.248; % cost of time in inventory [CU] 
ceng=.6065; % cost ofan engine change [CU] 
copr=O; % cost of operational state 
beta2=.89; % beta of holding time in failure state [days] 
theta2=12.01569; % theta of holding time in failure state [days] 
beta3= 1.001; % beta of holding time in OVH,C&R,NFF states [days] 
theta3=7.4167; % theta of holding time in OVH,C&R,NFF states 
beta6=1.234; % beta of holding time in inventory state [days] 
theta6=53.065; % theta of holding time in inventory state [days] 
beta7=1.209; % beta of holding time in eng change state [days] 
theta7=134.4; % theta of holding time in eng change state [days] 
% transition probabilities over the interval 0-3000 FH 
prlfail=.003915; % failure rate [I/FD] 
prleng=.002001; % eng change rate [I/FD] 
pr 1 ovh=.1111; % probability of an overhaul 
prlcrr=.5555; % probability of a C&R 
prlnff=.3333; % probability of a NFF 
% transition probabilities over the interval 3001-6000 FH 
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pr2fail=. 002046; 
pr2eng=.001507; 
pr2ovh=.3684; 
pr2crr=.3684; 
pr2nff=.2632; 
% transistion probabilities over the interval 6001-9000 FH 
pr3 fail=. 002148; 
pr3eng=.001228; 
pr3ovh=.4286; 
pr3crr=.4286; 
pr3nff=.1429; 
% transition probabilities over the interval 9001-12000 FH 
pr4fail=.004695; 
pr4eng=.0005217; 
pr4ovh=.5; 
pr4crr=.3333; 
pr4nff=.1667; 
% transition probabilities+ over the interval 12001-15000 FH 
pr5fail=.004~02; 
pr5eng=.0012; 
pr5ovh=l; 
pr5crr=O; 
pr5nff=O; 
%tsoft=1282; % soft time overhaul interval [FD] 
numidgs=500; % number ofIDGs to simulate 
tobslim=1317; %time [FD] that limits observation interval 
cprint=O; 
for k=l:numidgs 
tcal=O; tsov=O; state= 1; totcal=O; 
while (tsov<=tobslim) % limit observations to 10,000 FH 
if state 1 % operational************************** 
deltat= 1; % time interval = 1 FD 
tfail=O; % time since last fail= operation time 
for tsov=tsov:deltat: 1317 
tfail=tfail+deltat; 
iftsov>=O & tsov<263 % 0 to 3000 FH peril rate 
prfail=pr 1 fail; 
preng=pr 1 eng; 
elseiftsov>=263 & tsov<527 % 3001 to 6000 FH 
prfail=pr2fail; 
preng=pr2eng; 
elseiftsov>=527 & tsov<790 % 6001 to 9000 FH 
prfail=pr3 fail; 
preng=pr3 eng; 
elseiftsov>=790 & tsov<1054 % 9001 to 12000 FH 
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prfail=pr4fail; 
preng=pr4eng; 
elseiftsov>=l054 & tsov<=1317 % 12001 to 15000 FH 
prfail=pr5fail; 
preng=pr5eng; 
end 
tcal=tfail; % calendar time = time since ovh 
rtest=rand; 
if rtest>=O & rtest<=prfail 
% failure state 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=tfail; 
· dtcal(cprint)=tcal; 
cost(cprint)=O; 
totcal=tfail+totcal; % increment total cal time 
state=2; 
break 
elseif rtest>prfail & rtest<=(prfail+preng) 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint)=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=tfail; 
dtcal( cprint )=teal; 
cost( cprint )=O; 
totcal=tfail+totcal; % increment total cal time 
state=?; 
break 
else 
state= 1; % remain operational 
end 
end 
elseif state 2, % failure state ******************* 
r=round(theta2*((-log(l-rand)Y'(l/beta2))); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is I day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
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dtsov( cprint )=O; 
dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=cfa; 
% determine next state 
% determine the transistion prob. depending on tsov 
iftsov>=O & tsov<263 % 0 to 3000 FH peril rate 
pr2to3=prlovh; 
pr2to4=pr 1 err; 
elseiftsov>=263 & tsov<527 % 3001 to 6000 FH 
pr2to3=pr2ovh; 
pr2to4=pr2crr; 
elseif tsov>=527 & tsov<790 % 6001 to 9000 FH 
pr2to3=pr3ovh; 
pr2to4=pr3 err; 
elseiftsov>=790 & tsov<l054 % 9001 to 12000 FH 
pr2to3=pr4ovh; 
pr2to4=pr4crr; 
elseiftsov>=l054 & tsov<=l3 l 7 % 12001 to 15000 FH 
pr2to3=pr5ovh; 
pr2to4=pr5crr; 
end 
iftsov>=tsoft % soft-time overhaul 
state=3;. % OVH state 
else 
r=rand; 
if r<=pr2to3 
state=3; % OVH state 
elseif ( r>pr2to3 )&( r<=(pr2to3+pr2to4)) 
state=4; % C&R state 
else 
state=S; % NFF state 
end 
end 
elseif state--3 % overhaul state****************** 
tsov=O; % reset FH to zero on overhaul 
r=round(theta3*((-log(l-rand))"'(l/beta3))); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is 1 day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; % increment cal time 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=O; 
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dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=covh; 
% since ovh, start with new IDG 
break 
elseif state 4 % C&R state********************* 
r=round(theta3*((-log(l-rand))"(l/beta3))); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O .· 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is 1 day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; % increment cal time 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=O; 
dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=ccr; 
% next state is inventory 
state=6; 
elseif state 5 % NFF state******************* 
r=round(theta3 *((-log(l-rand))"(l/beta3))); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is 1 day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; % increment cal time 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=O; 
dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=cnff; 
% next state is inventory 
state=6; 
elseif state=6 % inventory state * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
r=round( theta6 *( (-log(l-rand) )"(1/beta6)) ); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is 1 day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; % increment cal time 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=O; 
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dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=cinv; 
% next state is operational 
state=l; 
elseif state=7 % engine change state * * * * * * * 
r=round(theta7*((-log(l-rand)Y'(l/beta7))); 
if r = 0 % check for case when r=O 
r= 1; % minimum time in a state is 1 day 
end 
totcal=totcal+r; % increment cal time 
% write results to output file 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
trk( cprint )=k; 
states( cprint )=state; 
dtsov( cprint )=O; 
dtcal( cprint )=r; 
cost( cprint )=ceng; 
% next state is operational 
state=l; 
end 
end 
end 
nseed 
tsoft 
tobslim 
%*************************************************** 
% This part of the program takes the data generated 
% and calculates statistics 
%***************************************************** 
% Determine the percent ofNFF, C&R, and OVH failures 
novh=O;nnff=O;nccr=O;neng=O; 
for j= 1:length( states) 
if states(j)=3 % number of overhauls 
novh=novh+ 1; 
elseif states(j)=4 % number of C&R 
nccr=nccr+ 1; 
elseif states(j)=5 % number of NFF 
nnff=nnff+ 1; 
elseif states(j)=7 % number of eng changes 
neng=neng+ 1; 
end 
end 
nfails=novh+nccr+nnff; % total number of failures 
clc 
fprintf(' Summary - Types ofRepairs\n') 
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fprintf('\n') 
fprintfl:' STATE # EVENTS PERCENT\n') 
fprintfl:' ----- -------- -------\n') 
fprintfl:' OVH %d %3. lf\n',novh,(novh/nfails)* 100) 
fprintfl:' C&R %d %3. lf\n',nccr,(nccr/nfails)*lOO) 
fprintfl:' NFF %d %3. lf\n',nnff,(nnff/nfails)*lOO) 
% Determine percent types of removals, ie, eng chg or failure 
pengchg=( neng/( neng+nfails) )* 100; % percent eng changes 
pfails=(nfails/(neng+nfails) )* 100; % percent failures 
fprintfl:'\n') 
fprintfl:' Summary - Types ofRemovals\n') 
fprintfl:'\n') 
fprintfl:' REASON FOR\n') 
fprintfl:' REMOVAL # EVENTS PERCENT\n') 
fprintfl:' ------- -------- -------\n') 
fprintfl:' ENG CHG %d %3. lf\n',neng,pengchg) 
fprintfl:' FAILURE %d %3. lf\n',nfails,pfails) 
% Average times in each state 
nopr=O; nfail=O; novh=O; nccr=O; nnff=O; ninv=O; neng=O; 
for j= 1: length( states) 
if states(j)=l % operation 
topr(nopr+ 1 )=dtcal(j); % transfers cal time data to array 
nopr=nopr+ 1; % increment op state counter 
elseif states(j)=2 % failure state 
tfail(nfail+ 1 )=dtcal(j); % transfers cal times to array 
nfail=nfail+ 1; % counts the number times in failure state 
elseif states(j)=3 % overhaul 
tovh( novh+ 1 )=dtcal(j); 
novh=novh+ 1; 
elseif states(j)=4 % C&R 
tccr(nccr+ 1 )=dtcalG); 
nccr=nccr+ 1; 
elseif states(j)=S % NFF 
tnff(nnff+ 1 )=dtcalG); 
nnff=nnff+ 1; 
elseif statesG)=6 % inventory 
tinv(ninv+ 1 )=dtcal(j); 
ninv=ninv+ 1; % sums number of visits to inventory 
elseif states(j)=7 % engine change 
teng( neng+ 1 )=dtcal(j); 
neng=neng+ 1; 
end 
end 
% calculate and display averages for each state 
fprintf('\n') 
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fprintft' Holding Times for each State\n') 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' STATE A VERAGE[DAYS] V ARIANCE[DAYS]\n') 
fprintft'------ ------------- ------------· \n') 
fprintft' OPERATION %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(topr),std(topr)"2) 
fprintft' F All,URE %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tfail),std(tfail)"2) 
fprintft' OVERHAUL %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tovh),std(tovh)"2) 
fprintft' C&R %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tccr),std(tccr)"2) 
fprintft' NFF %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tnfl),std(tnfl)"2) 
fprintft' INVENTORY %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(tinv),std(tinv)"2) 
fprintft' ENG CHG %4. lf %8. lt\n',mean(teng),std(teng)"2) 
% Cost per flight hours 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' Cost per flight hour= %g [CU/FH]\n',sum(cost)/(sum(topr)* 11.39)) 
% Calculation of MTBUR - Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals 
% An unscheduled removal is for failure only 
% MTBUR = (total flight hours)/(total failures) 
mtbur=(sum(topr)*l 1.39)/nfail; 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' MTBUR= %g [FH]\n',mtbur) 
% MTBF=(total flight hours)/(total confirmed failures) 
mtbf=(sum(topr)* 11.39)/(novh+nccr); 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' MTBF = %g [FH]\n',mtbf) 
% Number of units total 
fprintft'\n') 
fprintft' Number of units= %g\n',max(trk)) 
%************************************************** 
% This section converts the data into a format so 
% it can be read by program thperil.m, which 
% calculates the peril rate. 
%************************************************** 
% Calculate the cumulative time since OVH ( cumtsov) 
cumtsov=zeros(max(trk),6); 
for ltrk=l:max(trk) % loop thru each trk # 
ntrk=O; % counts numer of times for each trk # 
nfail=O; % counts number of failures per trk # 
tsf=O; % time since failure 
for ldat=l:length(states) % loop thru each row 
if trk(ldat) ltrk 
ntrk=ntrk+ 1; 
onetrk(ntrk, 1: 3 )=[ltrk states(ldat) dtsov(ldat)]; 
end 
end 
% extract failures from onetrk() and write to cumtsov() 
140 
% array onetrk(,) contains: 
% rowl =tracking#, row2 = state, row3 = operational time 
for lonet=l:ntrk 
% keep adding operational times until C&R or OVH 
tsf=tsf+onetrk(lonet,3 ); 
if ( ( onetrk(lonet,2)=3)1( onetrk(lonet,2)-4)) 
% stop adding operation time at OVH or C&R 
nfail=nfail+ 1; 
cumtsov(ltrk,nfail)=tsf; 
tsf-=O; % reset time since failure 
end 
end 
lastint(ltrk)=O; % contains final operational interval 
if onetrk(ntrk,2)=1 % final event is operation state 
lastint(ltrk)=tsf* 11.39; 
end 
cumtsov(ltrk, 1 :nfail)=cumsum( cumtsov(ltrk, 1 :nfail) ); 
end 
cprint=O; 
% convert cumtsvo() from flight days to flight hours 
cumtsov(:,:)=l l.39*cumtsov(:,:); 
for ltrk=l:max(trk) 
% count the number of nonzero entries in cumtsov() 
lnonz=O; 
for j=l:6 
if cumtsov(ltrk,j)>O 
lnonz=lnonz+ 1; 
end 
end 
% output format depends on # of nonzero numbers in cumtsov() 
iflnonz=l 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcperil( cprint, 1 :8)=[1e-10,cumtsov(ltrk, 1 )+lastint(ltrk),cumtsov(ltrk, 1 ),0,0,0,0,0]; 
elseif lnonz=2 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcperil( cprint, 1: 8)=[ 1 e-
10,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, 1 ),cumtsov(ltrk,2 ), 0, 0, 0, 0]; 
elseif lnonz=-3 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
mcperil( cprint, 1: 8)=[ 1 e-
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l 0,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+Iastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, 1 ),cumtsov(ltrk,2 ),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ), 0, 0, 
O]; 
elseif lnonz==4 
cprint=cprint+ 1; 
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mcperil( cprint, I : 8)=[ I e-
l O,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3),cum 
tsov(ltrk,4),0,0]; 
elseif lnonz=S 
cprint=cprint+ I; 
mcperil( cprint, I :8)=[le-
l O,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),cum 
tsov(ltrk,4),cumtsov(ltrk,5),0]; 
elseif lnonz=6 
cprint=cprint+ l; 
mcperil( cprint, I : 8)=[ I e-
l 0,max( cumtsov(ltrk,: )+lastint(ltrk) ),cumtsov(ltrk, I ),cumtsov(ltrk,2),cumtsov(ltrk,3 ),cum 
tsov(ltrk, 4 ),cumtsov(ltrk,5),cumtsov(ltrk, 6) ]; 
end 
end 
% write output file 
fid=fopen('thperils.dat','w'); 
save 'thperils.dat' mcperil -ascii 
status=fclose( fid); 
APPENDIX E.7 
OUTPUT DATA FOR SAMPLE RUN 
OF PROGRAM THSIMEVL.M 
EDU» thsimevl 
c= 
1996 2 23 5 3 8 
nseed = 
1 
tsoft = 
1282 
tobslim = 
1317 
Summary - Types of Repairs 
STATE #EVENTS PERCENT 
OVH 
C&R 
NFF 
500 
505 
297 
38.4 
38.8 
22.8 
Summary - Types of Removals 
REASON FOR 
REMOVAL # EVENTS PERCENT 
ENG CHG 557 30.0 
FAILURE 1302 70.0 
Holding Times for each State 
STATE AVERAGE[DAYS] VARIANCE[DAYS] 
------------- --------------
OPERATION 196.9 42167.6 
FAILURE 12.6 187.8 
OVERHAUL 6.7 44.9 
C&R 7.4 46.0 
NFF 7.3 39.6 
INVENTORY 51.2 1581.1 
ENG CHG 120.2 9888.9 
Cost per flight hour= 0.000460872 [CU/FH] 
MTBUR= 3202.79 [FH] 
MTBF = 4149.29 [FH] 
Number of units= 500 
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APPENDIXE.8 
LISTING OF PROGRAM THSIMDAT.M 
% file: thsimdat.m, date: 2/17 /96 
% This program averages and plots the results of the 
% Monte Carlo simulation program 'thsimevl.m' 
% Variables: 
% stime{)= Soft time overhaul interval [FD] 
% cufh()= Cost per unit flight hour [CU/FH] 
% mtburO= Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal [FH] 
% mtbf()= Mean Time Between Failure [FH] 
whitebg 
%*************************************************** 
% figure - Cost per Unit Flight Hour for Simulated 
%Data 
%*************************************************** 
stime(l)=263; % 3000 FH overhaul interval 
cufh(l,l:3)=[.000450501 .000430939 .000444769 ]; 
mtbur(l,l:3)=[338135163486]; 
mtbftl,l:3)=[4060 4285 4169]; 
stime(2)=3 51; 
cufh(2,1:3)=[0.000444344 .00042752 .000435504]; 
mtbur(2,l:3)=[3410 3567 3509]; 
mtbft2,l:3)=[4141 4365 4286]; 
stime(3)=439; 
. cufh(3,l:3)=[0.000444835 .000426967 .000437373]; 
mtbur(3,l:3)=[3402 3579 3506]; 
mtbft3, 1 :3)=[ 4228 4454 4287]; 
stime( 4)=527; 
cufh(4,l:3)=[0.000439828 .000427582 .000426977]; 
mtbur(4,l:3)=[3439 3542 3573]; 
mtbft4,l:3)=[434o 4462 4406]; 
stime( 5)=615; 
cufh(5,l :3)=[.000441943 .000431967 .000431388]; 
mtbur(5,1:3)=[3375 3491 3526]; 
mtbft5,1:3)=[4286 4400 4415]; 
stime( 6)=702; 
cufh(6,l:3)=[0.00044343 l .000431623 .000434083]; 
mtbur(6,l:3)=[3343 3472 3519]; 
mtbft6,1:3)=[424143824357]; 
stime(7)=790; 
cufh(7,1:3)=[0.000443952 .000438328 .000439334]; 
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mtbur(7,1:3)=[3329 3408 3457]; 
mtbf(7,1:3)=[4234 4329 4306]; 
stime(8)=878; 
cuth(8,1:3)=[.000446676 .000446613 .000445242]; 
mtbur(8,1:3)=[3303 3333 3392]; 
mtbfl:8,1:3)=[422142524250]; 
stime(9)=966; 
cuth(9,1:3)=[.000454153 .000451394 .000453569]; 
mtbur(9,1:3)=[3245 3275 3298]; 
mtbfl:9,1:3)=[419141864208]; 
stime(l 0)=1054; 
cuth(IO,l:3)=[.000460755 .000456935 .000460091 ]; 
mtbur(l 0, 1 :3)=[3204 3222 3242]; 
mtbfl:10,l:3)=[4150 4148 4124]; 
stime(l 1)=1141; 
cuth(l l,1:3)=[.000460813 .000456994 .000460156]; 
mtbur(l 1,1:3)=[3203 3221 3241]; 
mtbfl:11, 1 :3)=[ 4150 4148 4123]; 
stime(12)=1282; 
cufh(12,1:3)=[.000460872 .000457046 .000460223]; 
mtbur(12,1:3)=[3202 3221 3241]; 
mtbfl:12,l:3)=[4149 4147 4123]; 
% calculte averages 
for kk=l:12 
avgcuth(kk)=mean( cuth(kk,:) ); 
stdcuth(kk)=std( cuth(kk,:) ); 
avgmtbur(kk )=mean(mtbur(kk,:) ); 
stdmtbur(kk)=std( mtbur(kk,:) ); 
avgmtbfl:kk)=mean( mtbf(kk,:) ); 
stdmtbfl:kk )=std( mtbfl:kk,:) ); 
end 
% plot data 
errorbar(stime* 11.39,avgcuth,stdcuth) 
axis([2000 15000 4e-4 5e-4]) 
title('Cost per Flight Hour') 
xlabel('Overhaul Interval [FH]') 
ylabel('CU/FH') 
%print 
pause 
%************************************************ 
% figure - Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal 
% for Simulated Data 
%************************************************ 
errorbar(stime* 11.39,avgmtbur,stdmtbur) 
axis([2000 15000 2500 4000]) 
145 
title{'MTBUR - Simulated Data') 
xlabel('Overhaul Interval [FH]') 
ylabel('MTBUR') 
%print 
pause 
%*********************************************** 
% figure - Mean Time Between Failures for 
% Simulated Data 
%*********************************************** 
errorbar(stime* 11.39,avgmtbf,stdmtbf) 
axis([2000 15000 3500 5000]) 
title{'MTBF - Simulated Data') 
xlabel('Overhaul Interval') 
ylabel('MTBF) 
%print 
pause 
elf; 
o/o*********************************************** 
% write data to screen 
%*********************************************** 
disp('Overhaul Standard') 
disp('Interval Deviation') 
disp{'FH CU/FH CHIFH) 
fprintft'\n') 
for kk=l:12 
fprintft'o/o4.0f o/o6.6f % 7. 7t\n',stime(kk)* 11.39,avgcuth(kk),stdcuth(kk)) 
end 
fprintft'\n') 
disp('Overhaul Standard Standard') 
disp('Interval Deviation Deviation') 
disp('FH MTBUR MTBUR MTBF MTBF') 
fprintft'\n') 
for kk=l:12 
fprintft'o/o4. Of o/o4. Of o/o4. Of o/o4. Of . 
o/o4. Ot\n',stime(kk)* 11. 39 ,avgmtbur(kk),stdmtbur(kk),mtbftkk),stdmtbftkk)) 
end 
o/o************************************************************* 
% figure - Availability 
o/o************************************************************* 
avail=avgmtbur ./( 4+avgmtbur); 
plot(stime* 11.39,avail,'k-') 
%axis([2000 15000 . 9987 . 999]) 
xlabel('Overhaul Interval [FH]') 
ylabel('Availability') 
pause 
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%print 
% write availability results to screen 
fprintf('\n') 
disp('Overhaul') 
disp('Interval') 
disp('FH Availability') 
fprintf('\n') 
for kk=l: 12 
fprintf('%5.0f %7.7f\n',stime(kk)*ll.39,avail(kk)) · 
end 
APPENDIX E.9 
TABULAR OUTPUT OF PROGRAM THSIMDAT.M 
EDU» thsimdat 
Overhaul Standard 
Interval Deviation 
FH CU/FH CH/FH 
2996 0.000442 0.0000101 
3998 0.000436 0.0000084 
5000 0.000436 0.0000090 
6003 0.000431 0.0000073 
7005 0.000435 0.0000059 
7996 0.000436 0.0000062 
8998 0.000441 0.0000030 
10000 0.000446 0.0000008 
11003 0.000453 0.0000015 
12005 0.000459 0.0000020 
12996 0.000459 0.0000020 
14602 0.000459 0.0000020 
Overhaul Standard Standard 
Interval Deviation Deviation 
FH MTBUR MTBUR MTBF MTBF 
2996 3461 71 4060 113 
3998 3495 79 4141 114 
5000 3496 89 4228 117 
6003 3518 70 4340 61 
7005 3464 79 4286 71 
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7996 3445 
8998 3398 
10000 3343 
11003 3273 
12005 3223 
12996 3222 
14602 3221 
Overhaul 
Interval 
FH Availability 
2996 0.9988456 
3998 0.9988569 
5000 0.9988570 
6003 0.9988643 
7005 0.9988466 
7996 0.9988401 
8998 0.9988242 
10000 0.9988048 
11003 0.9987792 
12005 0.9987603 
12996 0.9987599 
14602 0.9987598 
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91 4241 75 
65 4234 50 
45 4221 17 
27 4191 12 
19 4150 14 
19 4150 15 
20 4149 14 
APPENDIXF 
COMPUTER PROGRAM TO PLOT 
THE CU/FH FOR A TYPE II POLICY 
% file: thhardt.m, 2/25/96 
% hard time replacement policy 
whitebg 
cmr=.969; % cost of a minimal repair 
csr= I; % cost of a scheduled removal 
cmrup=l.0659; % cost of minimal repair plus 10% 
csrup= 1.1; % cost of scheduled removal plus I 0% 
cmrlow=.8721; % cost ofa minimal repair less 10% 
csrlow=.9; % cost of scheduled removal less 10% 
lamda2k=2.08e-5; % 2k left truncated data 
beta2k=l.27; % 2k left truncated data 
lamda5k=2.32e-10; % 5k left truncated data 
beta5k=2.47; % 5k left truncated data 
tau= I 00: I 00: 15000; 
% hard time replacement plot 
costht2k=( cmrup*lamda2k*tau. "beta2k+csrup )./tau; 
costht5k=( cmrlow*lamda5k*tau. "beta5k+csrlow)./tau; 
plot( tau,costht2k, 'k-. ',tau,costht5k, 'k: ') 
axis([O 15000 0 .0015]) 
legend('k-.','Upper Bound','k:','Lower Bound') 
title('CU/FH with Type II Maintenance') 
xlabel('Replacement Age [FH]') 
ylabel('Cost Function [CU/FH]') 
print 
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